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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, INSIDERS AND THE FIRM 
by 
Vinh Huy Nguyen 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Suchismita Mishra, Major Professor 
This dissertation is comprised of three chapters that focus on three topics related to 
institutional investors’ and registered insiders’ trading activities around corporate 
announcements. This research provided insights into the trading behavior of institutions 
and insiders around corporate events when they are influenced by the anticipation and 
arrival of new information. Data samples were stratified, regression models were 
estimated, and control variables were added to ensure the results are significant and robust.  
The first chapter discussed the information signaling hypothesis around share 
repurchase announcements. I examined if institutions can trade profitability around the 
announcement time using signals from insiders and the firm. I found that only transient 
institutional investors are able to adjust their portfolios to take advantage of the post-
announcement price run-up. The second chapter explored the relationship between 
information asymmetry and the information acquisition process. It appeared that 
institutions prefer using lower cost, small, round lot, 100-share multiples when they can 
acquire information in advance of the event as in earnings announcements. The last chapter 
looked at if the information hierarchy hypothesis holds true at the very top of the corporate 
pyramid. I found that CEO trades are largely ignored and president net purchases have 
vi 
positive effects on M&A post-announcement returns. In summary, institutions, insiders, 
and the firm play important roles in the information dissemination and acquisition process. 
Hence, their decisions have profound effects on their complicated, interconnected 
relationships.
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CHAPTER 1: INSTITUTIONAL FORESIGHT—DO INSTITUTIONS PROFIT FROM 
REPURCHASE ANNOUNCEMENTS 
I. Introduction 
Are institutional investors always informed? Regarded as sophisticated traders by 
both academics and practitioners, institutional investors may have the ability to interpret 
information from corporations to trade profitably. In my paper, I show that this perception 
may not always be true, particularly around repurchase announcements. The information 
signaled in repurchase announcements by the firm and its insiders to investors about the 
valuation and future growth of the company has a significant announcement effect (Ofer 
and Thakor 1987). Many researchers have documented the significant positive market 
reactions to repurchase announcements (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995; 
Peyer and Vermaelen 2009; Bargeron, Kulchania, and Thomas 2011). Hence, informed 
traders can make a profit by buying the stock at a lower price before the price appreciation, 
and then sell the stock at a higher price at the peak of the price appreciation.  
However, institutional profitability is affected by the activities of two other parties: 
the firm and its registered insiders. In the context of my study of repurchase 
announcements, there are three players—the firm, insiders, and institutional investors. All 
three are informed, but clearly, information asymmetry exists. Institutional investors—the 
biggest investors in U.S. equities holding approximately 75 percent of U.S. stocks 
(Alexander, Peterson, Beardsley 2014)—are known to have superior research skills. They 
trade based on information about upcoming events only if the expected profit is higher than 
the cost of obtaining the private information (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988). As an integral 
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part of the company, the insiders1 have private information that they can use to manage 
their personal portfolios. The presence of private information alters the trading patterns of 
all market participants. The insiders must consider how their transactions affect prices and 
trade size in the current and future trades (Kyle 1985). If their information advantage is 
short-lived, the insiders are more likely to execute their trades in a short period of time. 
Conversely, if the insiders expect the information advantage to be long-lasting, they are 
more likely to spread their trades over consecutive months. In both scenarios, the insiders 
experience significant abnormal returns (Cicero and Wintoki Working Paper Series). 
Finally, I have the announcing firm that is supposedly the most informed about its current 
financial condition and future earnings. The firm also has the advantage of deciding if it 
will follow through with actual share repurchases and the timing of such repurchases. In 
my sample, 35 percent of the firms do not follow through. Thus, repurchase announcements 
can create a period of heightened uncertainty. For this reason, I examine institutional 
foresight at the time of the announcement. If institutional investors are truly more informed, 
they should be able to trade profitably before the actual repurchases.  
My paper differs from prior research in two regards: (1) I focus on the institutional 
investors’ decisions around the announcement, and (2) I use three different data sources: 
quarterly 13(f) data, biweekly short interest data, and daily intermarket sweep order data. 
In De Lisle, Morscheck, and Nofsinger (2014), they provide evidence of institutional 
selling around repurchases. Their findings relate specifically to the actual repurchase 
                                                      
1 I define an insider as any person who is directly or indirectly own more than 10% of the firm’s equity or 
who is an officer or director of the company according to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 
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period when most of the repurchase decisions are already made public. Arguably, less is 
known about the firm’s intentions during the announcement period. Additionally, because 
institutional investors hold the majority of U.S. equities, logically, they would take the 
opposite side of the firms’ actual repurchases for the right price. They are the liquidity 
providers when the firms are actually repurchasing. However, institutional investors are 
not subject to strong counterparty purchases during the days before the announcement. The 
authors also do not assess if institutions benefit economically from trading around 
repurchases. In my paper, I find evidence of institutional net buying and profit for transient 
investors, and net selling and significant losses for ISO traders and short sellers. To my 
knowledge, there is no existing literature that discusses institutional trading profitability 
around repurchase announcements where the company itself is party to forthcoming stock 
transactions. The second main difference is my usage of three databases to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of institutional trading, covering traders in long and short 
positions at the quarterly, biweekly, and daily frequency. My exploration goes beyond the 
13(f) filings to include activities of ISO traders and short sellers. These three data 
frequencies allow us to examine institutional trading from the big-picture viewpoint to the 
day-to-day perspective.  
I first start with the 13(f) data as they provide a broad understanding of institutional 
trading behavior for a wider range of time. I use this database to examine how institutional 
investors trade around repurchase announcements before assessing institutional 
profitability. I find that institutional investors are aware of these events, and they actively 
trade during the quarters around the announcement. Institutional investors exhibit a 
positive or neutral trade imbalance up until the announcement quarter. At which point, 
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institutions begin to sell shares of the announcing firms. This negative trade imbalance 
persists for the following six consecutive quarters, and then institutional trading reverts to 
the pre-announcement trend.  
Furthermore, I also examine institutional trading by investor type based on the 
Bushee (2001) classifications. I find that transient institutional investors—the institutions 
with high portfolio turnover and diversified holdings with a focus on short-term gains—
make up almost 42% of the total institution trading volume in my sample. These investors 
appear to be aware of the price appreciation after the announcement. They hold on to their 
long position until the announcement quarter when they start selling the accumulated 
shares for more than the initial purchase price. Transient investor’s net selling trend during 
the quarters [0, +3] is associated with positive and significant cumulative average abnormal 
return of 5.55%***. After capturing the short-term gains, these investors revert to their 
normal buying trend in Q+4.  
With a big-picture understanding, I continue the analysis with a closer examination 
at the daily frequency using ISO data. I use ISO to evaluate institutional trading for two 
main reasons: (1) they are typically used by institutions and (2) ISO data provide the exact 
timestamp, price, quantity, and trade condition to calculate institutional profit 
(Chakravarty, Jain, Upson, and Wood 2012). My analysis finds that institutional investors 
exhibit a negative trade imbalance during the [-5, +5] days around repurchase 
announcements, and this selling trend leads to significant losses, especially in the long 
term. 
In addition to examining institutional trading activities from the long position 
perspective, I also analyze the trading activities of short sellers, who specifically increase 
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or decrease their short interest depending on whether they predict the prices to go up or 
down, respectively.  Although the sequence of opening and closing the portfolios are 
flipped for long-only institutions and short sellers, both are considered as sophisticated 
traders, and both are hypothesized to take similar economic exposure to repurchase 
announcements (Christophe, Ferri, and Angel 2004). If the short sellers are to avoid 
significant loss, I expect them to exhibit a neutral response or significant decrease in short 
selling around repurchase announcements, which are associated with future price increases. 
Rather, I find evidence of significant abnormal short selling during the three biweekly 
periods after the announcement. This abnormal short interest occurs at a time when the 
post-announcement price run-up has just started. Stock prices have not reached their peaks. 
In fact, the price appreciation lasts beyond the abnormal short selling period, creating fewer 
opportunities for short sellers to close their short positions profitably at a lower price. In 
summary, I find that ISO traders and short sellers are not taking advantage of the possible 
gains around the announcement period. Conversely, transient investors appear to be 
profiting from the post-announcement price appreciation by selling shares they 
accumulated during the pre-announcement quarters. These findings are robust when 
compared to the findings of the control sample of non-announcing firms, the sample of 
announcing firms during the non-announcing time, and the sample of non-
contemporaneous events.  My in-depth analysis of institutional trading in a period of 
heightened information asymmetry around repurchase announcements shows that some 
institutions are overlooking the potential short-term profits. Figure 1-1 provides a visual 
summary of institutional trading and profit.  
6 
II. Literature Review 
 There are two main hypotheses widely discussed in repurchase literature: free cash 
flow and information signaling. The first hypothesis explains that repurchases can be used 
to reduce the cash available to the firm’s management (Jensen 1986). The author describes 
free cash flow as the cash left over after the firm has invested in all available positive NPV 
projects. The firm will repurchase shares using the cash available to prevent managers from 
investing in negative NPV projects. The information signaling hypothesis explains that the 
firm uses repurchases to signal positive future earnings. If the firm believes that its shares 
are undervalued, it can signal such information to the market using repurchase 
announcements (Bhattacharya 1979, Miller and Rock 1985, and Vermaelen 1981).  
In both hypotheses, information asymmetry exists. In the free cash flow hypothesis, 
if there are no profitable investments, the decision to repurchase or invest in the negative 
NPV projects depends on the benefits to the insiders. In the information signaling 
hypothesis, the insiders can buy more of the firm’s stocks at a lower price and sell these 
shares at a higher price after the post-announcement price run-up. However, in the latter 
hypothesis, the information asymmetry between the firm, insiders and investors is higher. 
The firm and its insiders can announce without committing to any actual repurchases. 
Because of this flexibility and private information, investors are at a disadvantage. In fact, 
false signaling can transfer a large amount of wealth from the investors to the insiders 
(Fried 2005).  
To reduce opportunities to manipulate the market, lawmakers have established key 
regulations to increase transparency. Beginning in January 2004, the SEC requires that the 
announcing firm discloses its repurchase activities every quarter. They must disclose the 
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total number of shares repurchased during the previous quarter, the average price paid for 
those shares, the number of shares that were purchased as a part of a previously announced 
plan, and the maximum number of shares that could be repurchased. Although the new 
regulation aims to curb the firm’s incentive to exploit the investor’s information 
disadvantage, the disclosure is not made public until months after the transaction. This 
delay makes the disclosure less useful in reducing information asymmetry in the market, 
especially during the announcement period.  
Apart from requiring firms to disclose their repurchasing information, lawmakers 
also established Rule 10b-5, which requires insiders 1) to refrain from trading the firm’s 
shares when they have “material” nonpublic information or 2) to disclose the information. 
However, to be charged with breaking Rule 10b-5, the insiders have to intentionally 
deceive others. Fraud due to negligent behavior will not invoke Rule 10b-5. Furthermore, 
the information has to be “material,” giving the insiders an unfair advantage to unduly 
influence the market. Otherwise, the insiders are free to trade because they have not 
violated Rule 10b-5. Interestingly enough, insiders are most active around large 
repurchases and the abnormal returns are higher when net insider buying exists compared 
to when insiders are net sellers (Bonaime and Ryngaert 2013). These findings show that 
proving insiders are in violation of Rule 10b-5 requires considerable evidence. Simply 
knowing that insiders are active around repurchases and have the opportunity to profit is 
not enough. Evidence of intentional manipulation using material, nonpublic information 
must exist. While there are regulations in place to reduce the firm and insiders’ ability to 
profit from trading with investors using private information, information asymmetry still 
influences the trading decisions of the firm, insiders, and investors.  
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Although institutional investors may be at a disadvantage by not having private 
information, they may be able to interpret signals conveyed by the firm and insiders. There 
is evidence of institutional trading profitability. Researchers find that institutions have 
significant stock-picking skills (Grinblatt and Titman 1993, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers 1997, Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermer 2000, and Wermers 2000). In Bushee 
(2001), the author classifies institutional investors into three types based on portfolio 
turnover and investment horizon. The author finds that transient investors, who have high 
portfolio turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings, prefer near-term expected 
earnings and that their myopic trading strategy generates significant abnormal returns. 
These transient investors are different from the other two types. Dedicated institutional 
investors have very low portfolio turnover and larger average portfolio investments. Quasi-
indexer institutional investors also have low portfolio turnover but highly diversified 
portfolio holdings. Both dedicated and quasi-indexer investors have longer investment 
horizons. More recently, Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) find that mutual funds 
can trade profitably around earnings announcements because of their ability to forecast 
earnings-related fundamentals. They also find that mutual fund buys consistently 
outperforms their sell trades. Nevertheless, these findings are for earnings announcement. 
The current literature about institutions and repurchases explains that the 
repurchasing firms can buy their shares back at a bargain price if the firms have little 
institutional interest (De Cesari, Espenlaub, Khurshed, and Simkovic 2012). Without 
institutional involvement, the firms can take further advantage of the information 
asymmetry by buying back shares from less informed traders. However, institutional 
investors are active around actual repurchases; they are net sellers when the firms are 
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implementing repurchases (De Lisle, Morscheck, and Nofsinger 2014). These findings 
suggest that institutional investors are possibly aware of the profit opportunities and may 
be buying around repurchase announcement events. I hypothesize that institutions can trade 
profitably by buying around the announcement time and selling around the actual 
repurchase period. Using this strategy, institutional investors can accumulate shares at a 
lower price before the post-announcement price run-up, and sell the shares back to the 
firms at the peak of the price appreciation.  
III. Hypotheses 
Based on prior research, it is well-established that institutional investors are 
informed. In this study, I focus on three institutional types—ISO traders, transient 
institutions, and short sellers. Chakravarty, Jain, Upson, and Wood (2012) provide 
evidence that ISO trades are associated with larger information share than NISO trades 
mainly used by liquidity traders. Ke and Petroni (2004) find that transient institutions can 
predict a break in consecutive earnings increases a quarter before it happens. Finally, short 
sellers can generate positive and significant profit around earnings announcements 
(Christophe, Ferri, and Angel 2004). While it is clear that they are skilled traders, are these 
institutions able to replicate the same success around share repurchase announcements? 
Therefore, I test the central or main null hypothesis that institutional investors can 
trade profitably around the announcement time, especially with information signaled by 
the firm and insiders. To fully understand how the different levels of information affect 
institutional investors, I calculate institutional trading profits for ten different scenarios 
shown in Figure 1-2. The scenarios are separated by the direction of insider transactions—
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net buy, net sell or neutral—and the firm’s follow-through decision—actual repurchase 
versus announcement-only. I reformulate my central hypotheses in the context of each 
scenario as follows. 
Correspondingly, the main question about institutional profitability is conditional 
on the different levels of signaling from the firms and registered insiders. The first 
hypothesis uses the full sample; it tests if institutional investors are able to trade profitably 
using only the information from the announcement. I evaluate institutional performance by 
measuring the profitability of institutional buy and sell trades (Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett 
2007). Following their methodology, I calculate profit using ISO buy and sell prices and 
CRSP daily closing prices. ISO prices for trades initiated on day ! = −5,−4,−3,−2,−1  
relative to the announcement day are used as the prices for the starting trades in the pre-
announcement period. ISO prices for trades initiated on day ! = +1,+2,+3,+4,+5  are 
used as the prices for the starting trades in the post-announcement period. ISO prices for 
trades initiated on day ! = 0	are the prices for trades initiated on the announcement day. 
These prices are then compared to the CRSP daily closing prices on various test dates. 
CRSP daily closing prices are used as the prices of the ending trades on day - = +5 and +90. I include as control variables the number of shares authorized in the announcement, 
the firm’s market capitalization, EPS surprise, market risk premium, SMB, HML and, 
UMD. EPS forecast surprise measures the difference between the actual and mean analyst 
forecast divided by the share price (Keung, Lin, and Shih 2010; Baker, Litov, Wachter, and 
Wurgler 2010).  
The second hypothesis tests if institutional investors can trade profitably using 
information from the announcement and insiders. Insider trades are a valuable source of 
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information to investors because the insiders run the company and are much better 
informed about the firm’s future prospects. The more often they trade, the more 
information is revealed to the public, giving investors more opportunities to reallocate their 
resources and potentially make profitable trades (Manne 1966; Bernhardt, Hollifield and 
Hughson 1995). To test the hypothesis, I divide the full sample into three sub-samples 
based on net insider buying, selling, and a neutral position. Insider trade direction is 
determined based on their transactions during the previous six months when they are found 
to be most active (Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang 2012). Insider trading during the pre-
announcement period gives investors some insight into management’s confidence in the 
firm’s future performance. If the insiders purchase more shares, the undervaluation signal 
appears more credible to investors. Conversely, net insider selling will dampen the 
undervaluation signal (Bonaime and Ryngaert 2013). Given the three insider trade 
directions, I expect institutional profit to be the highest when institutions and insiders are 
both net buyers.  
The third hypothesis tests if institutional investors can trade profitably given all the 
information from the insiders and firm, which include both announcement signals and the 
follow-through decision. I further divide the full sample into six sub-samples based on 
insider trading, and whether or not the firm actually repurchases shares within eight 
quarters similar to Bonaime (2012). Given all the scenarios, I expect institutional profit to 
be the highest when all three players—institutions, insiders, and firm—are purchasing 
shares. The undervaluation signal is strongest when the insiders are net buyers and the firm 
follows through with actual repurchases. Combined, they signal to the market that the firm 
is poised for positive future earnings. Hence, institutional investors can earn positive and 
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significant profit if they buy more shares before the post-announcement price run-up. In 
contrast, increased institutional selling around such repurchases may indicate the absence 
of institutional foresight.  
IV. Data 
The data for share repurchases are from the Securities Data Company (SDC). My 
repurchases sample2 has 3,394 repurchase announcements from 1878 firms reported from 
September 2007 to December 2013. The firms announce the repurchase of approximately 
242.67 billion shares and actually repurchase 37.79 billion shares at an average repurchase 
price of $33.16. In total, these firms spent $1.15 trillion to repurchase their shares (SDC).  
Companies can repurchase shares through open-market acquisitions, private negotiation, 
tender offers, Dutch auction, and accelerated share repurchases. Although there are several 
methods of repurchases, the open market method is the most popular.  
My institutional datasets are from three different sources: 1) TAQ for daily ISO 
data, 2) Compustat for biweekly short interest data, and 3) Thomson Reuters 13(f) for 
quarterly institutional trade summary. Although I evaluate institutional profitability using 
all three datasets, I focus on ISO because the data provide the timestamp, exact price, 
quantity, and trade condition to calculate institutional profit. In the other two datasets, I 
calculate profit by using Compustat and CRSP closing prices.  
ISO are limit orders that automatically execute in designated markets while 
simultaneously submitting orders in the markets with better prices. ISO represent 31% of 
                                                      
2 In another sample, I excluded all repurchase announcements that coincide with other corporate news, such as 
dividend announcements, earnings announcements, merger and acquisition announcements, and stock splits, to 
avoid any confounding influence. My results are robust even when the contemporaneous events are excluded. 
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the volume and 38% of trades in my sample. Fully integrated in September 2007, ISO are 
mainly used by informed institutional traders to sweep multiple markets of their liquidity, 
although possibly at an inferior price (Chakravarty, Jain, Upson, and Wood 2012).  ISO 
traders are more concerned about execution speed and order fulfillment. Faster execution 
gives institutional investors more opportunities to trades profitably before price-sensitive 
information is released, for example, in repurchase announcements. Hence, I focus on ISO 
to determine if institutional investors can make a profit using a more aggressive trading 
mechanism.  
I also analyze the trading activities of short sellers, which account for 
approximately 26% of the daily volume (Alexander, Peterson, Beardsley 2014), to 
determine if these sophisticated traders can benefit from repurchase announcements. 
Considering that there is a price appreciation after the announcement, I expect to see a 
significant decrease in short selling up to the price run-up. Short sellers stand to gain the 
most during the post-announcement period. My third dataset, Thomson Reuters 13(f), 
provides a big-picture summary of institutional trading. The 13(f) data provide required 
filings of institutional investment managers with over $100 million in assets. I use the 
quarterly updates to understand long-term institutional trading and to determine if 
institutions profit in the quarters around the announcement. Lastly, for the other variables, 
I use analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, accounting data from Compustat, and insider 
trading data from Thomson Reuter TFN U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 
4.  
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V. Findings 
Before I can answer questions related to institutional profitability, I first need to 
determine if institutional investors are actively trading around the repurchase 
announcements. Using the 13(f) data, I analyze institutional trading for eight quarters 
before and after the announcement quarter. The quarterly data frequency allows us to 
evaluate when institutional trading is impacted by repurchase announcements and how long 
the effects last. Overall, I find that institutional trading is affected by repurchase 
announcements immediately in the announcement quarter, and the effects last for the 
following six consecutive quarters.  
In Table 1-1, I show that the announcing firms during the non-announcing time, 
quarters [-8, -5], are associated with significant positive or neutral institutional trade 
imbalance. The trade imbalances from Q-8 to Q-5 are 0.10%*, 0.08%, 0.17%***, and 
0.22%***. During the pre-announcement period of quarters [-4, -1], institutional investors 
exhibit similar trading patterns as in the non-announcement time. The trade imbalances 
from Q-4 to Q-1 are -0.04%, 0.12%***, 0.28%***, and -0.03%.  
In fact, in my control sample of non-announcing firms, I find that there is a positive 
trade imbalance for the quarters around the announcement with varying degrees of 
significance. The positive trade imbalances range from 1.45%*** in Q-8 to 0.27% in Q+8. 
This control sample shows that the firms with no connections to repurchase announcements 
are associated with net institutional buying. So far without any influences from repurchase 
announcements, institutional investors take a neutral or positive trade imbalance position. 
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Once the firm announces repurchases in Q0, institutional investors change their 
trading behavior. They become net sellers. Institutional investors exhibit a trade imbalance 
of -0.50%*** starting in the announcement quarter, Q0, and the negative trade imbalance 
lasts for the next six quarters. The trade imbalances from Q+1 to Q+6 are -0.53%***, -
0.39%***, -0.47%***, -0.39%***, -0.29%***, and -0.08%** respectively. After these 
quarters of significant net selling, institutional trading reverts to a neutral trading position 
in Q+7, which means that repurchase announcements do affect institutional trading and the 
effects last for approximately seven quarters. 
 Furthermore, I can determine which institutions are more likely to be influenced 
by the announcements using the Bushee (2001) transient, dedicated and quasi-indexer 
classifications of institutional investors. As I suspected, transient investors seem to be 
influenced by the announcements. Figure 1-3 shows how transient investor trading pattern 
changes throughout the 17 quarters. During the non-announcement time, these investors 
are net buyers exhibiting a positive trade imbalance of 0.10%* in Q-8, 0.19%*** in Q-7, 
0.23%*** in Q-6, and 0.15%*** in Q-5 shown in Table 1-1. This trend continues into the 
pre-announcement quarters [-4, -1] with trade imbalances of 0.09%*, 0.15%***, 0.08%, 
and 0.00%. However, they become net sellers starting in the announcement quarter with a 
trade imbalance of -0.25%***, and the net selling persists for the following three 
consecutive quarters with trade imbalances of -0.22%***, -0.11%**, and -0.13%***. 
Moreover, the significant negative trade imbalance pattern during this time is associated 
with a significant positive cumulative average abnormal return of 5.55%***. Then in Q+4, 
these investors revert back to their neutral or net buying pattern with a trade imbalance of 
0.07% rising to 0.38%*** in Q+8. I believe that transient institutional investors would be 
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most affected by repurchase announcements compared to the other two types because they 
are more focus on short-term gains. Transient investors are more likely to be cognizant and 
responsive to corporate news. Although the other two investor types may be aware of the 
announcements, they are less likely to change their long-term goals in response to the news 
release.  
With some understanding of how institutional investors trade on a quarterly 
frequency in a four-year time span, I turn my attention to how institutions trade during the 
five days around the announcement. My analysis of daily institutional trading covers three 
distinct periods similar to Jain and Wang (2013): the pre-announcement period is the five 
days [-5,-1] window leading up to the announcement date, day 0 is the announcement date, 
and the post-announcement period is the five days [+1, +5] after the event date. Although 
I am studying the perceptiveness of institutional investors before and on the announcement 
date, I include the post-announcement period to evaluate the institutional investor’s 
immediate reaction to the repurchase information.  
Based on the well-documented, positive market reaction to the announcement, I 
expect institutional investors to be net buyers around these three periods. Purchasing these 
shares before the price run-up reaches its peak is a profitable strategy. Rather than 
observing a net buying trend, I found evidence of significant negative institutional trade 
imbalance 3 for all 11 days shown in Table 1-2. During the pre-announcement period, I 
expect institutional investors to take a neutral trading position because they may not be 
                                                      
3 Trade imbalance is calculated as the net shares traded in the quarter normalized by the number of shares 
outstanding. Daily negative trade imbalance is expressed in basis points and quarterly negative trade 
imbalance is expressed in percentages. 
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able to predict the timing of the announcement. Therefore, to see that these investors are 
presenting themselves as sellers even before the firms announce their repurchase intention 
is rather surprising. The significant trade imbalances of -0.8**, -1.3***, -1.2***, -0.7***, 
and -0.9*** on days [-5, -1] relative to the announcement day shown in Table 2 Panel A 
suggest that the institutional investors do not perceive value in these firms before the 
repurchase event. On the announcement day and during the post-announcement period, 
institutional investors would gain if they are net buyers. Yet, I observe significant negative 
trade imbalances during both periods ranging from -0.5*** to -1.8*** shown in Table 1-2 
Panel B The net selling trend suggests that institutional investors do not foresee the possible 
gains that follow repurchase announcements and are selling to the better-informed traders.  
To consider the effects of insiders, I separate the full sample based on whether the 
corporate insiders are net buyers or net sellers in the period surrounding the repurchase 
announcement.	 My method of classifying insider trade direction is similar to that of 
Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013). The announcement event is considered net selling if insider 
sales exceed insider purchases by at least 0.01% of the firm’s market capitalization. The 
announcement event is considered net buying if purchases exceed sales by the same 
requirement. Otherwise, the event is associated with neutral insider trading. These 
classifications are based on the transactions of insiders during the previous six months 
relative to the announcement because insiders are found to be most active during this period 
based on the findings of Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2012). I find that institutional 
investors are not following the trading signals from insiders; institutional investors are still 
net sellers with trade imbalances ranging from -0.2 to -1.5 when insiders are net buyers.  
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Finally, I divide the full sample into six sub-samples based on insider trading and 
the firm’s decision to follow through after the announcement. In the sub-samples where 
the firms follow through with actual repurchases within eight quarters, institutional 
investors are net sellers in both the pre- and post-announcement periods. In fact, the highest 
negative trade imbalance of 2.1*** is on day +1 in the subsample with the follow-through 
signal. This result is rather unexpected since the firm’s follow-through signal should tell 
the institutions to purchase more shares. Table 1-2 also shows the institutional trades for 
the announcement-only subsamples given the different insider trading patterns. In all three 
announcement-only subsamples, institutional investors are generally net sellers although 
the net selling trend is not as strong as in the follow-through subsamples. In summary, I 
observe that institutional investors are strong net sellers during the days around repurchase 
announcements.  
Using the ISO data, I can also examine how institutional investors trade throughout 
the announcement day. I divide the trading day into fifteen-minute intervals, and I also 
include trades before market opens and after market closes. In Figure 1-4, I show the 
trading volume of institutional investors during these time segments. There is a U-shaped 
pattern associated with institutional trading on the announcement day, which is congruent 
with investors’ heterogeneous willingness to bear risk in an informationally asymmetric 
environment. Figure 1-4 also shows a spike in trading volume from 11:30 AM to 11:45 
AM. This outlier is due to the American Express repurchase announcement of 150 
million shares on March 25, 2013. During this short window, institutions used ISO to 
trade approximately 125 million shares. From this trading volume, 58% were buy shares 
and 42% were sell shares. The abnormal trading associated with the American Express 
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announcement is another piece of evidence that institutions do use ISO to sweep through 
the book. 
When I calculate the intraday trade imbalance, I observe that there is an overall 
negative trade imbalance. I show in Table 1-3 that the negative trade imbalances are 
significant and strongest before the market opens and immediately before the market 
closes. The pre-market trade imbalance is -0.001**. The trade imbalances during the time 
segments of 03:00 PM - 03:15 PM, 03:15 PM - 03:30 PM, 03:30 PM - 03:45 PM, and 
03:45 PM - 04:00 PM are -0.001**, -0.001*, -0.0008**, and -0.002***, respectively. 
These findings provide more evidence that institutional investors are net sellers around 
the announcements. Furthermore, when I divide the full sample based on the insider 
signals and the firm’s follow through decision the net selling trend persists.  
My third source of sophisticated trading is the short interest data, reported biweekly 
during the middle of the month and at the end of the month. Similar to the negative trade 
imbalance intuition around the post-announcement price appreciation, I expect abnormal 
short selling to occur closer to the peak of the price run-up when shorting makes the most 
sense. Therefore, short sellers should not trade during the immediate weeks around the 
repurchase announcement which is followed by price increases. To measure abnormal 
short selling I use two different methods. The first measure calculates abnormal short 
interest as the difference between the benchmark period short interest and the test period 
short interest. The second measure calculates the Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) 
abnormal short selling as the average number of share sold short in the test period divided 
by the average number of shares sold short in the benchmark period minus one. The 
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benchmark period in both figures is six biweekly periods before the announcement period, 
ending approximately one quarter before the announcement. Using both measures of 
abnormal short interest, I find significant abnormal short selling in the immediate three 
biweekly periods after the repurchase announcement as shown in Table 1-4 Panel B. The 
abnormal short interests in periods [+1, +3] are 0.22%*, 0.27%**, and 0.22%*; the CFA 
abnormal short interests in the same biweekly periods are 7.31%*, 8.15%**, and 7.87%*. 
Again, I find evidence of abnormal selling around the announcement. With all three 
institutional datasets explaining similar trading behaviors, I now examine the profitability 
of these trades. 
Using the exact pricing of the ISO trades, I can calculate profitability without using 
any proxies for the buy and sell transactions. Daily institutional profit is determined using 
ISO buy and sell prices and CRSP daily closing prices. I compute profitability using closing 
prices five and ninety days after the announcement to assess institutional short- and long-
term performance. Table 1-5 shows the average profitability for all ISO buy-and-sell trades 
opened during the [-5, +5] days and closed on day +5 relative to the announcement (t=0). 
Panel A shows the profits for all ISO buy trades, and Panel B shows the profits for all ISO 
sell trades.  
I find that the institutional investors that bought during the five days before the 
announcement earn profits ranging from 0.60% on day -5 to 1.60%*** on day -1 shown in 
Table 1-5 Panel A. Conversely, institutional investors that sold their shares before the 
announcement have negative profits: -0.34% on day -5, -0.66%* on day -4, -0.93%** on 
day -3, -1.47%*** on day -2, and -1.13%*** on day -1 shown in Table 1-5 Panel B. Based 
on these results, institutional investors should be purchasing shares in the pre-
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announcement period so they can sell these shares later at a higher price. During the post-
announcement period, purchasing shares appears to be not profitable as prices may have 
already risen; selling during this time seems to be more profitable than buying. For 
example, ISO sell trades on day +3 result in a positive and significant profit of 0.88%***. 
In fact selling during the other days in the post-announcement period is also profitable, 
albeit not as high as on day +3. As for trading on the announcement day, ISO traders are 
better off buying than selling. Although the buy profit of 0.05% is not significantly 
different from zero, the sell profit is -0.48% which is lower than that of the buy strategy. 
From the full sample, I find that traders profit when they buy before the 
announcement and sell after the announcement. This pattern holds true even when I divide 
the full sample by insider trading. Interestingly, when the announcement is associated with 
net insider buying, profits or losses are higher relative to the announcements associated 
with insider selling or neutral insider trading. For example, the ISO sell profits on day +3 
for announcements associated with net insider buying, selling and neutral are 2.05%***, 
0.37%, and 0.34%, respectively. The ISO buy profit on day +4 for net insider buying, 
selling, and neutral trading are -1.87%***, -0.85%**, and -0.09%, respectively. In 
Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013), the authors explain that repurchasing firms associated with 
net buying experience significantly higher abnormal returns relative to the firms with net 
insider selling. Similar to their findings for repurchasing firms, I observe that institutional 
trading profits and losses around the announcement are amplified with net insider buying. 
Finally, I dissect the profitability patterns according to both insider transactions and 
the firm’s follow-through or announcement-only decision shown in Table 1-5. I find that 
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institutional profits (losses) for ISO buy trades are higher (lower) when the firms follow 
through with actual repurchases. For instance, the buy profits during the pre-announcement 
period, days [-5, -1], for the subsample with net insider selling and the firm’s follow-
through are 1.06%**, 1.07%**, 1.09%*, 1.71%***, and 1.96%***; the profits for the 
comparable announcement-only scenario are -0.30%, -0.72%, -0.51%, 0.08%, and 0.33%. 
The difference between the follow-through and announcement-only signals can be as large 
as 1.79%. When the firms only announce and do not repurchase, profits (losses) for ISO 
sell trades are higher (lower) than in the actual repurchase scenarios. The sell profits during 
the post-announcement period, days [+1, +5], for the subsample with net insider buying 
and the firm’s follow-through are 1.43%, 1.85%**, 1.75%**, 0.71%, and -0.17%***; the 
profits for the announcement-only scenarios are 2.44%, 1.27%, 2.69%*, 3.38%**, and -
0.09%. The difference between the follow-through and announcement-only scenarios is as 
large as 2.67%.  
I also extend my profit analysis to a longer time horizon to see if these trends persist 
when the opening trades are closed +90 days after the announcement. I find that the 
institutional ISO buy trades opened in both the pre- and post-announcement periods result 
in significant and positive profits shown in Table 1-6. This finding is rather different from 
the short-term profit analysis where the buy trades opened only in the pre-announcement 
period result in profits. I believe the short +5 closing day does not capture the full length 
and effects of the post-announcement price run-up. Similarly, because the price 
appreciation lasts longer than five days after the announcement, the sell trades opened in 
the post-announcement period and closed +90 days after the announcement result in 
significant losses. In the long run, selling during the 11 days around the announcement 
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result in significant losses and buying during those days result in significant gains. Based 
on my finding that institutional investors exhibit significant negative trade imbalance 
during the 11 days, I conclude that they are not able to trade profitably.   
With evidence that short sellers are also active around the announcement, I examine 
their ability to trade profitably. I calculate profit as the difference between the proceeds 
from the sale and the cost to close the position using CRSP closing prices. Table 1-7 shows 
the number of shares sold short and covered as well as the profits for several cumulative 
biweekly periods. I observe that the abnormal short selling that occurred in the post-
announcement [+1, +3] biweekly period is not completely covered until the end of the +8 
biweekly period. The significant abnormal short selling in the post-announcement [+1, +3] 
biweekly period leads to a significant loss because the cost to close the short position is 
higher than the revenue from the opening trades. Most noticeably, the short sellers’ loss 
increases as I expand the trading window. I find that any trading intervals between the time 
of abnormal short selling, biweekly period +1, to the time that the shares are covered in 
biweekly period +8 result in a loss of 0.627%***. The loss is a result of the short sellers’ 
poor timing relative to repurchase announcement. They appear to be short selling the shares 
too soon. As I have shown with the long-run +90 day ISO profit, the price appreciation 
lasts beyond the first three biweekly periods, so the significant short selling during the [+1, 
+3] biweekly period is premature. Similar to the ISO results, I conclude that short sellers 
are not able to trade profitably around repurchase announcements.  
While there is strong evidence that institutional investors overall do not trade 
profitably around repurchase announcements, there are some institutions that have the 
foresight to benefit from these announcements. Table 1-8 shows the regression results of 
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institutional sell profit on closing day +90. I see that transient institutional investors can 
trade profitably. In the full sample, for every transient investor trading around the 
announcement sell profit increases by 0.14%***. Furthermore, these traders are profitable 
regardless of how the insiders trade and whether the firm follows through with share 
repurchases. For example, when the announcement is associated with net insider buying 
(selling) signal, the sell profit increases by 0.12%*** (0.11%***) for every transient 
investor participating in the event. A similar trend is observed for the follow-through and 
announcement-only subsamples. The results are controlled by the number of shares 
authorized for repurchase, the number of shares outstanding, EPS surprise, market risk 
premium, SMB, HML, and MOM. During the pre-announcement period, these transient 
traders are net buyers. Once the price run-up occurs post announcement, these traders sell 
their shares as the price increases. Because these investors are more flexible they can take 
advantage of the announcement event until the price appreciation disappears, at which 
point they revert to their normal trading behavior. 
VI. Conclusion 
Using three different data sources, I find that institutional investors do pay attention 
to firms announcing share repurchases. Institutional investors exhibit a neutral or positive 
trade imbalance in the eight quarters before the announcement. Then starting on the 
announcement quarter, they begin to actively sell shares of the announcing firms lasting 
for six more quarters. Out of the three institutional types, transient investors seem to have 
the ability to time their trades. They accumulate shares during the pre-announcement period 
to sell in the post-announcement period, which turns out to be a profitable strategy. Short 
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sellers are also active around the announcement. They exhibit abnormal short selling during 
the [+1, +3] biweekly periods after which point the significant shorting disappears. Unlike 
the transient investors, short sellers are not profiting from repurchase announcements. They 
open their short positions too soon at the beginning of the price appreciation and close their 
short interest approximately 16 weeks after the announcement when the average price is 
still high. Short sellers appear to be selling prematurely and cheaply around repurchase 
announcements. 
With some understanding how repurchase announcements affect trading on a long-
term basis, I turn my attention to institutional trading at the daily frequency. I find that 
institutional investors are net sellers in all [-5, +5] days regardless of the information 
signaled by the insiders and firms. This is not a profitable sign for institutional investors 
since most firms experience a price increase after a repurchase announcement. Profitability 
pattern consistently shows that institutional investors make a profit when they purchase 
shares around the announcement, especially during the days leading up to the event. My 
findings suggest that institutions with the exception of transient investors, who have a 
shorter investment horizon than the others, are generally not interested in altering their 
long-term trading strategy around repurchase announcements for short-term gains.  
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Figure 1-1 
Timeline of Institutional Trading and Profitably 
This figure shows the timeline of events around repurchase announcements (t=0). I examine insider transaction signals during the six months prior to the 
announcement and the firm’s follow-through decision during the eight quarters after the announcement. The transient quarterly trade imbalance is calculated 
as the net shares traded normalized by the number of shares outstanding. Abnormal short interest is calculated using two different methods. The first measure 
calculates the abnormal short interest as the difference between the benchmark period short interest and the test period short interest. The second measure 
calculates the Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) abnormal short selling as the average number of shares sold short in the test period divided by the average 
number of shares sold short in the benchmark period minus one. The benchmark period in both measures is six biweekly periods before the announcement 
period, approximately one quarter before the announcement. The daily trade imbalance is calculated as the difference between the number of sell shares and 
the number of buy shares normalized by the number of shares outstanding, expressed in basis points. Short selling profit is calculated as the difference between 
the proceeds from the sale and the cost to close the position using CRSP closing prices. Institutional ISO profit is determined using ISO buy-and-sell prices 
and CRSP daily closing prices. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.	
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Figure 1-2 
Sample Division by Hypothesis 
This figure shows how the full sample is divided for each of the three hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H1) tests if institutional investors can trade profitably 
using only the information from the announcement. H1 uses the full sample. The second hypothesis (H2) tests if institutional investors can trade profitably 
using information from the announcement and insiders. H2 divides the full sample into three sub-samples based on net insider buying, selling, and neutral 
position. The third hypothesis (H3) tests if institutional investors can trade profitably using information from the announcement, insiders and the firm’s decision 
to follow through with the implementation of actual repurchase transactions. H3 further divides the full sample into six sub-samples based on insider 
transactions, and whether or not the firm actually repurchases shares within eight quarters. 
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Figure 1-3 
Quarterly Institutional Trade Imbalance Separated by Investment Behavior 
This graph shows the trade imbalance of all institutional investors as well as those of the transient, quasi-indexer, and dedicated institutional investor around 
the announcement quarter (t=0). The trade imbalance is calculated as the net shares traded, the number of shares bought minus the number of shares sold, in 
the quarter normalized by the number of shares outstanding. I separate institutional trading by three types according to Bushee (2001). Transient institutional 
investors have high portfolio turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings. Transient investors are more focus on short-term gains. Dedicated institutional 
investors have very low portfolio turnover and larger average portfolio investments. Quasi-indexer institutional investors also have low portfolio turnover but 
highly diversified portfolio holdings. Both dedicated and quasi-indexer investors have longer investment horizons. My control firm quarterly institutional trade 
imbalance is calculated using non-repurchase-announcing firms. 
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Figure 1-4 
Intraday Intermarket Sweep Order Trading Volume 
This graph shows the average trading volume of institutional investors during the pre-market time, post-market time, and fifteen-minute intervals during trading 
hours. 
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Table 1-1 
Quarterly Institutional Trade Imbalance and Price 
This table shows the quarterly institutional trade imbalance for the quarters around the announcement (t=0). The trade imbalance is calculated as the net shares 
traded, the number of shares bought minus the number of shares sold, in the quarter normalized by the number of shares outstanding. I separate institutional 
trading by three types according to Bushee (2001). Transient institutional investors have high portfolio turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings. 
Transient investors are more focus on short-term gains. Dedicated institutional investors have very low portfolio turnover and larger average portfolio 
investments. Quasi-indexer institutional investors also have low portfolio turnover but highly diversified portfolio holdings. Both dedicated and quasi-indexer 
investors have longer investment horizons. My control firm quarterly institutional trade imbalance is calculated using non-repurchase-announcing firms. ***, 
**, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Trade imbalance for quarters [-8, -1] 
Quarterly Period -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Number of announcements 2106 2230 2405 2482 2604 2702 2724 2748 
Number of announcing firms 1013 1077 1241 1315 1427 1531 1560 1596 
Institutional trade imbalance 0.10%* 0.08% 0.17%*** 0.22%*** -0.04% 0.12%*** 0.28%*** -0.03% 
Transient institution trade imbalance 0.10%* 0.19%*** 0.23%*** 0.15%*** 0.09%* 0.15%*** 0.08% 0.00% 
Dedicated institution trade imbalance -0.06% -0.15%*** -0.14%*** -0.13%*** -0.14%*** -0.13%*** -0.06% -0.06% 
Quasi-indexer institution trade imbalance 0.01% -0.03% -0.01% 0.09%* -0.01% 0.05% 0.19%*** 0.01% 
Control firm institutional trade imbalance 1.45%*** 1.13%*** 0.70%** 0.64%** 0.67%** 0.69%*** 0.73%*** 0.49%** 
Price $29.90 $29.87 $28.02 $28.90 $28.94 $29.88 $31.45 30.62 
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Panel B: Trade imbalance for quarters [0, +8] 
Quarterly Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of announcements 2750 2654 2626 2599 2515 2435 2396 2337 2267 
Number of announcing firms 1596 1561 1529 1491 1438 1377 1371 1314 1293 
Institutional trade imbalance -0.50%*** -0.53%*** -0.39%*** -0.47%*** -0.39%*** -0.29%*** -0.08%** -0.03% -0.03% 
Transient institution  
trade imbalance 
-0.25%*** -0.22%*** -0.11%** -0.13%*** 0.07% 0.03% 0.24%*** 0.23%*** 0.38%*** 
Dedicated institution  
trade imbalance 
-0.12%*** -0.19%*** -0.20%*** -0.18%*** -0.17%*** -0.07%* -0.11%*** -0.16%*** -0.08%* 
Quasi-indexer  
institution trade imbalance 
-0.16%*** -0.17%*** -0.13%*** -0.20%*** -0.35%*** -0.25%*** -0.23%*** -0.13%** -0.32%*** 
Control firm  
institutional trade imbalance 
0.77%*** 0.72%*** 0.63%** 0.68%** 0.62%** 0.57%* 0.71%** 0.75%*** 0.27% 
Price $31.32 $30.56 $31.45 $32.12 $31.22 $31.95 $33.08 $34.55 $33.01 
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Table 1-2 
Daily Intermarket Sweep Order Institutional Trade Imbalance 
This table reports the daily intermarket sweep order (ISO) institutional trade imbalance. The daily trade imbalance is calculated as the difference between the 
number of sell shares and the number of buy shares normalized by the number of shares outstanding, expressed in basis points of the number of shares 
outstanding of a company for days [-5, +5] around the announcement. The pre-announcement period spans from day -5 to -1, inclusive. The announcement 
day period is day 0. The post-announcement period spans from day +1 to +5, inclusive. Net insider trading direction is separated into three categories: net 
buying, net selling and neutral. My method of classifying insider trade direction is similar to that of Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013). The announcement event 
is considered net selling if insider sales exceed insider purchases by at least 0.01% of the firm’s market capitalization. The announcement event is considered 
net buying if purchases exceed sales by the same requirement. Otherwise, the event is associated with neutral insider trading. These classifications are based 
on the transactions of insiders during the previous six months relative to the announcement because insiders are found to be most active during this period 
based on the findings of Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2012). I further divide the sample using the firm’s decision to follow through during the eight 
quarters after the announcement similar to Bonaime (2012). ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Daily ISO trade imbalance for the pre-announcement period 
 
 
Number of firms 1878 
Number of announcements 3394 
Days around the announcement (t=0) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Trade imbalance for full sample -0.8*** -1.3*** -1.2*** -0.7*** -0.9*** 
Trade imbalance with net insider buying signal -0.7** -1.4*** -1.3*** -1.0*** -0.6 
Trade imbalance with net insider selling signal -0.8*** -1.3*** -1.5*** -0.8** -0.8*** 
Trade imbalance with neutral insider trading signal -0.8** -1.0*** -0.5 0.1 -1.2*** 
33 
 
Panel B: Daily ISO trade imbalance for the announcement and post-announcement period 
Days around the announcement (t=0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Trade imbalance for full sample -0.9** -1.8*** -0.9** -0.8*** -0.5*** -0.6*** 
Trade imbalance with net insider buying signal -1.5*** -1.3*** -0.7* -0.8*** -0.2 -0.3 
Trade imbalance with net insider selling signal -0.7 -1.8*** -1.5** -0.7** -0.8*** -0.6** 
Trade imbalance with neutral insider trading signal -0.2 -2.6* 0.5 -0.9** -0.6** -1.1*** 
 
 
Days around the announcement (t=0) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Trade imbalance with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals -0.3 -0.4 -1.4*** -1.1*** -0.3 
Trade imbalance with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals -0.8*** -1.3*** -1.4*** -0.6 -0.7** 
Trade imbalance with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals -1.1** -1.0*** -0.7** -0.5 -1.1*** 
Trade imbalance with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals -1.6* -3.5 -1.0 -0.7 -1.4 
Trade imbalance with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals -0.6 -1.3** -1.8*** -1.5* -1.3** 
Trade imbalance with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals -0.1 -1.0* 0.2 1.8 -1.5** 
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Days around the announcement (t=0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Trade imbalance with net insider buying and  
firm's follow-through signals 
-0.6 -1.5*** -0.9 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5* 
Trade imbalance with net insider selling  
and firm's follow-through signals 
-0.1 -2.1*** -1.6** -1.1*** -0.6** -0.8*** 
Trade imbalance with neutral insider trading  
and firm's follow-through signals 
0.3 -0.4 0.6 -1.1** -0.7** -0.9*** 
Trade imbalance with net insider buying  
and firm's announcement-only signals 
-3.2 -0.9* -0.4 -1.2** 0.1 0.0 
Trade imbalance with net insider selling  
and firm's announcement-only signals 
-2.6* -0.8 -1.1* 0.4 -1.2** -0.1 
Trade imbalance with neutral insider trading  
and firm's announcement-only signals 
-1.3 -8.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.2 -1.8** 
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Table 1-3 
Intraday Intermarket Sweep Order Institutional Trade Imbalance 
This table reports the intraday intermarket sweep order (ISO) institutional trade imbalance. The intraday trade 
imbalance is calculated as the difference between the number of sell shares and the number of buy shares 
normalized by the number of shares outstanding. The intraday trade imbalance is calculated for three time 
periods: pre-market time, post-market time, and fifteen minutes intervals during trading hours. ***, **, * 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Time N Trade Imbalance 
Pre-market 991 -0.0010** 
09:30 AM - 09:45 AM 3320 0.0002 
09:45 AM - 10:00 AM 3306 -0.0020 
10:00 AM - 10:15 AM 3340 -0.0004 
10:15 AM - 10:30 AM 3269 -0.0007 
10:30 AM - 10:45 AM 3279 0.0003 
10:45 AM - 11:00 AM 3297 -0.0009 
11:00 AM - 11:15 AM 3275 -0.0005 
11:15 AM - 11:30 AM 3293 0.0006* 
11:30 AM - 11:45 AM 3251 0.0010 
11:45 AM - 12:00 PM 3278 0.0000 
12:00 PM - 12:15 PM 3227 -0.0007** 
12:15 PM - 12:30 PM 3242 -0.0004 
12:30 PM - 12:45 PM 3246 -0.0005 
12:45 PM - 01:00 PM 3231 -0.0002 
01:00 PM - 01:15 PM 3230 -0.0007* 
01:15 PM - 01:30 PM 3260 0.0004 
01:30 PM - 01:45 PM 3264 -0.0004 
01:45 PM - 02:00 PM 3268 -0.0030 
02:00 PM - 02:15 PM 3293 -0.0010 
02:15 PM - 02:30 PM 3308 0.0000 
02:30 PM - 02:45 PM 3306 -0.0001 
02:45 PM - 03:00 PM 3323 -0.0040 
03:00 PM - 03:15 PM 3361 -0.0010** 
03:15 PM - 03:30 PM 3393 -0.0010* 
03:30 PM - 03:45 PM 3441 -0.0008** 
03:45 PM - 04:00 PM 3629 -0.0020*** 
Post-market 1330 -0.0020 
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Table 1-4 
Biweekly Short Interest and Price 
The table shows the short interest and price for the biweekly periods around the announcement. Biweekly short selling is calculated as the short interest 
normalized by the number of shares outstanding. Short interest is calculated for the five biweekly periods before the announcement and eight biweekly periods 
after the announcement. Abnormal short interest is calculated using two different methods. The first measure calculates the abnormal short interest as the 
difference between the benchmark period short interest and the test period short interest. The second measure calculates the Christophe, Ferri, and Angel 
(2004) abnormal short selling as the average number of shares sold short in the test period divided by the average number of shares sold short in the benchmark 
period minus one. The benchmark period in both measures is six biweekly periods before the announcement period, approximately one quarter before the 
announcement. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Short interest for the pre-announcement period 
 
Biweekly period -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Short interest 4.59% 4.60% 4.57% 4.59% 4.61% 
Abnormal short interest 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 
CFA abnormal short interest  1.35% 0.99% 0.41% -0.95% -0.57% 
Price  $   29.22   $  29.11   $   28.88   $   28.63   $   28.36  
 
Panel B: Short interest for the announcement and post-announcement period 
 
Biweekly period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Short interest 4.70% 4.81% 4.85% 4.80% 4.80% 4.78% 4.79% 4.74% 4.74% 
Abnormal short interest 0.11% 0.22%* 0.27%** 0.22%* 0.21%* 0.20% 0.20% 0.16% 0.15% 
CFA abnormal short interest  5.55% 7.31%* 8.15%** 7.87%* 6.86% 6.36% 5.89% 6.07% 5.45% 
Price  $   28.49   $  28.61   $   28.57   $  28.61   $   28.60   $   28.72   $   28.80   $   28.90   $   28.88  
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Table 1-5 
Daily Intermarket Sweep Order Institutional Profitability 
This table shows the average profitability for all ISO buy-and-sell trades opened during the [-5, +5] days and closed on day +5 relative to the announcement 
(t=0). Institutional profit is determined using ISO buy-and-sell prices and CRSP daily closing prices. ISO prices for trades initiated on day ! = −5, +5 	relative 
to the announcement day are used as the prices for the opening trades. These ISO opening prices are compared to the CRSP daily closing prices on day +5. 
Panel A shows the profits for all ISO buy trades and Panel B shows the profits for all ISO sell trades. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Profitability of institutional ISO buy trades closing on day +5 relative to the announcement day (t=0) 
 
Number of firms 1878 
Number of announcements 3394 
Day of opening buy trades relative to announcement day (t=0) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Profit for full sample 0.60% 0.75%** 0.85%** 1.25%*** 1.60%*** 
Profit with net insider buying signal -0.24% 0.62% 0.64% 1.21% 1.86%** 
Profit with net insider selling signal 0.72%* 0.62% 0.69% 1.30%** 1.55%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal 1.68%*** 1.28%** 1.59%*** 1.22%** 1.29%*** 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals -0.38% 0.84% 0.81% 1.16% 2.10%*** 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals 1.06%** 1.07%** 1.09%* 1.71%*** 1.96%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals 1.73%*** 1.36%** 1.96%*** 1.60%*** 1.77%*** 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals 0.07% 0.17% 0.29% 1.32% 1.39% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals -0.30% -0.72% -0.51% 0.08% 0.33% 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals 1.53% 1.05% 0.53% 0.14% -0.07% 
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Day of opening buy trades relative to announcement day (t=0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Profit for full sample 0.05% -0.51%* -0.42% -0.87%*** -1.03%*** -0.05%* 
Profit with net insider buying signal -0.85% -1.24%* -1.07%* -1.45%** -1.87%*** -0.09% 
Profit with net insider selling signal 0.29% -0.17% -0.06% -0.62%* -0.85%** 0.00% 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal 0.96%*** -0.16% -0.24% -0.51% -0.09% -0.10%** 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals 0.46% -0.79% -1.13% -1.61%** -1.53%** -0.05% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals 0.50% -0.06% -0.09% -0.33% -0.54% 0.03% 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals 1.32%*** -0.04% -0.24% -0.32% -0.01% -0.07% 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals -3.41%* -2.15% -0.93% -1.12% -2.57%** -0.18% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals -0.33% -0.49% 0.01% -1.51% -1.76%* -0.08% 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals -0.09% -0.49% -0.23% -1.05% -0.32% -0.17%** 
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Panel B: Profitability of institutional ISO sell trades closing on day +5 relative to the announcement day (t=0) 
 
Number of firms 1878 
Number of announcements 3394 
Day of opening sell trades relative to announcement day (t=0) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Profit for full sample -0.34% -0.66%* -0.93%** -1.47%*** -1.13%*** 
Profit with net insider buying signal 1.03% -0.52% -0.67% -1.72%** -1.01% 
Profit with net insider selling signal -0.72% -0.47% -1.09%** -1.49%*** -1.11%** 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal -1.70%*** -1.37%*** -0.95% -1.00%* -1.42%*** 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals 0.57% 0.20% -0.10% -1.90%** -0.35% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals -1.21%** -0.82% -1.55%*** -1.94%*** -1.71%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals -1.75%*** -1.42%** -1.54%** -1.71%*** -1.85%*** 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals 1.99% -2.00% -1.83% -1.35% -2.36% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals 0.76% 0.59% 0.29% -0.17% 0.73% 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals -1.56% -1.24% 0.66% 1.03% -0.19% 
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Day of opening sell trades relative to announcement day (t=0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Profit for full sample -0.48% 0.42% 0.60%** 0.88%*** 0.81%*** -0.10%*** 
Profit with net insider buying signal 0.73% 1.76%** 1.66%** 2.05%*** 1.59%** -0.14%** 
Profit with net insider selling signal -1.19%*** -0.34% 0.09% 0.37% 0.47% -0.10%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal -0.76%* 0.07% 0.10% 0.21% 0.34% 0.00% 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals -0.16% 1.43% 1.85%** 1.75%** 0.71% -0.17%*** 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals -1.32%*** -0.22% 0.18% 0.23% 0.25% -0.12%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals -1.00%* -0.06% 0.10% 0.20% -0.08% -0.02% 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals 2.54% 2.44% 1.27% 2.69%* 3.38%** -0.09% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals -0.82% -0.71%** -0.16% 0.78% 1.14% -0.04% 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals -0.06% 0.43% 0.09% 0.22% 1.59% 0.05% 
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Table 1-6 
Daily Intermarket Sweep Order Institutional Profitability 
This table shows the average profitability for all ISO buy-and-sell trades opened during the [-5, +5] days and closed on day +90 relative to the announcement 
(t=0). Institutional profit is determined using ISO buy-and-sell prices and CRSP daily closing prices. ISO prices for trades initiated on day ! = −5, +5 	relative 
to the announcement day are used as the prices for the opening trades. These ISO opening prices are compared to the CRSP daily closing prices on day +5. 
Panel A shows the profits for all ISO buy trades and Panel B shows the profits for all ISO sell trades. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Profitability of institutional ISO buy trades closing on day +90 relative to the announcement day (t=0) 
 
Number of firms 1878     
Number of announcements 3394     
Day of opening buy trades relative to announcement day (t=0) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Profit for full sample 5.56%*** 5.86%*** 6.34%*** 6.20%*** 6.41%*** 
Profit with net insider buying signal 4.50%*** 4.14%*** 4.74%*** 4.75%*** 5.24%*** 
Profit with net insider selling signal 6.00%*** 6.57%*** 7.02%*** 6.65%*** 6.68%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal 6.20% 6.82% 7.26% 7.46% 7.62%* 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals 3.35%* 3.25%* 4.40%** 5.39%*** 4.50%** 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals 6.24%*** 6.77%*** 7.34%*** 6.74%*** 6.76%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals 2.58%** 2.82%** 3.29%** 3.61%*** 4.16%*** 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals 6.98%** 6.05%** 5.46%* 3.38% 6.78%** 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals 5.29%*** 5.99%*** 6.06%*** 6.41%*** 6.46%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals 16.97% 18.10% 18.51% 18.61% 17.56% 
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Day of opening buy trades relative to announcement day (t=0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Profit for full sample 4.98%*** 3.88%*** 4.20%*** 3.39%*** 2.35%*** 3.47%*** 
Profit with net insider buying signal 3.12%** 2.16% 2.31% 0.76% 0.83% 1.27% 
Profit with net insider selling signal 5.85%*** 4.63%*** 4.83%*** 4.16%*** 4.08%*** 4.43%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal 5.94% 4.84% 5.76% 5.86% 0.46% 4.69% 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals 4.07%** 1.76% 2.40% 1.11% 1.26% 0.98% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals 5.78%*** 4.38%*** 4.53%*** 4.16%*** 3.95%*** 4.26%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals 2.58%** 1.40% 1.91% 2.13%* 0.75% 0.38% 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals 1.20% 3.01% 2.13% 0.03% -0.08% 1.87% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals 6.04%*** 5.36%*** 5.75%*** 4.14%** 4.45%*** 4.95%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals 15.71% 14.70% 17.05% 16.72% -0.41% 17.40% 
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Panel B: Profitability of institutional ISO sell trades closing on day +90 relative to the announcement day (t=0) 
 
 
Number of firms 1878 
Number of announcements 3394 
Day of opening sell trades relative to announcement day (t=0) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Profit for full sample -5.26%*** -5.68%*** -6.04%*** -6.09%*** -6.36%*** 
Profit with net insider buying signal -3.83%*** -4.46%*** -4.36%*** -4.41%*** -5.09%*** 
Profit with net insider selling signal -5.96%*** -6.33%*** -6.99%*** -6.81%*** -6.70%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal -5.92% -6.06% -6.39% -7.08% -7.59%* 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals -3.05%** -4.43%** -3.48%* -4.78%** -4.76%** 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals -6.32%*** -6.48%*** -7.42%*** -6.88%*** -6.73%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals -2.27%* -1.74% -2.27% -3.18%** -4.09%*** 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals -5.49%* -4.52% -6.23%** -3.63% -5.80%* 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals -4.89%*** -5.90%*** -5.69%*** -6.63%*** -6.61%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals -16.73% -18.21% -17.92% -18.25% -17.69% 
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Day of opening sell trades relative to announcement day (t=0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Profit for full sample -5.24%*** -4.46%*** -4.21%*** -3.93%*** -2.60%*** -3.23%*** 
Profit with net insider buying signal -3.28%** -3.24%** -1.88% -1.89% -1.35% -0.91% 
Profit with net insider selling signal -6.34%*** -4.96%*** -5.10%*** -4.41%*** -4.27%*** -4.25%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading signal -5.77% -5.30% -5.87% -6.12% -0.44% -4.51% 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's follow-through signals -3.94%** -2.83%* -2.07% -1.85% -2.46% -1.19% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's follow-through signals -6.17%*** -4.50%*** -4.80%*** -4.26%*** -4.16%*** -4.00%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's follow-through signals -2.36%* -2.00%* -1.96% -2.17%* -0.90% -0.09% 
Profit with net insider buying and firm's announcement-only signals -1.90% -4.10% -1.50% -1.97% 0.98% -0.32% 
Profit with net insider selling and firm's announcement-only signals -6.85%*** -6.32%*** -5.99%*** -4.85%*** -4.58%*** -4.99%*** 
Profit with neutral insider trading and firm's announcement-only signals -15.63% -14.78% -17.42% -17.60% 0.95% -17.62% 
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Table 1-7 
Cumulative Biweekly Short Interest and Profit 
The table shows the cumulative number of shares sold short and short interest profit for five different biweekly windows around the announcement. Profit is 
calculated as the difference between the proceeds from the sale and the cost to close the position using CRSP closing prices. ***, **, * stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Biweekly period [+1,+4] [+1,+5] [+1,+6] [+1,+7] [+1,+8] 
Shares sold short 1361439 1668720 2012901 2319531 2596198 
Shares covered 1303344 1632608 1997630 2296255 2600383 
Short - cover 58,095 36,112 15,271 23,276 (4,185) 
      
Profit -0.199% -0.194% -0.500%*** -0.417%** -0.624%*** 
 Table 1-8 
Impact of Announcement Signals on Institutional Profitability 
This table reports the regression results of institutional sell profit for trades open on day -5 and close on day +90. The dependent variable is the profitability of 
institutional sells initiated on day -5 and closed on day +90. Transient institutional investors classified in Bushee (2001) have high portfolio turnover and 
highly diversified portfolio holdings. Transient investors are more focus on short-term gains. The number of transient investors is included as they are the most 
active institutional investor type.  LN (SHARES AUTHORIZED) and LN (SHROUT) are both standardized by taking the log of the number of shares 
authorized for repurchases and the number of shares outstanding, respectively. EPS forecast surprise measures the difference between the actual and mean 
analyst forecast divided by the share price. Net insider trading direction is separated into three categories: net buying, net selling and neutral. My method of 
classifying insider trade direction is similar to that of Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013). The announcement event is considered net selling if insider sales exceed 
insider purchases by at least 0.01% of the firm’s market capitalization. The announcement event is considered net buying if purchases exceed sales by the 
same requirement. Otherwise, the event is associated with neutral insider trading. These classifications are based on the transactions of insiders during the 
previous six months relative to the announcement because insiders are found to be most active during this period based on the findings of Chan, Ikenberry, 
Lee, and Wang (2012). I further divide the sample using the firm’s decision to follow through during the eight quarters after the announcement similar to 
Bonaime (2012). ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 FULL INSIDER BUY SIGNAL 
INSIDER SELL 
SIGNAL 
INSIDER BUY  
& FT SIGNALS 
INSIDER SELL  
& FT SIGNALS 
INSIDER BUY  
& NFT 
SIGNALS 
INSIDER SELL  
& NFT 
SIGNALS 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TRANSIENT 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0009* 0.0012*** 0.0016 0.0011* 
LN (SHARES AUTHORIZED) -0.0814*** -0.0507*** -0.0386*** -0.0153 -0.0327** -0.1015*** -0.0612** 
LN (SHROUT) 0.0221 0.0260 0.0144 -0.0003 0.0041 0.0479 0.0426 
EPS SURPRISE 0.4341*** -1.2658*** 0.6314*** -1.2943*** 0.6344*** -0.9550* -1.2191 
MKT-RF -0.0060 -0.0019 -0.0085 0.0001 -0.0051 -0.0003 -0.0274 
SMB 0.0251 0.0356* 0.0302 0.0081 0.0331 0.1016* 0.0236 
HML 0.0547* 0.0012 -0.0095 0.0148 -0.0007 -0.0627 -0.0462 
UMD 0.0372** 0.0049 0.0082 0.0219 0.0128 -0.0532 -0.0074 
INTERCEPT 0.6442* 0.1402 0.1631 0.1011 0.2571 0.4727 -0.0009 
R-SQUARED 3.4% 8.7% 12.4% 4.8% 13.2% 20.8% 8.9% 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 2.9% 7.2% 11.5% 2.7% 12.1% 14.9% 4.8% 
47 
CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL TRADE SIZE PREFERENCE AROUND 
CORPORATE ANNOUNCEMENTS 
I. Introduction 
Armed with superior research skills, informed and sophisticated institutional 
investors are able to acquire private information and swiftly profit from such information. 
To do so, these traders must be strategic with their trades. In the context of my study, I am 
particularly interested in institutional size preference. Does one size fit all when it comes 
to informed trading? Barclay and Warner (1993) find that informed investors tend to use 
medium-sized trades, and these trades have the highest cumulative price changes. 
Chakravarty (2001) provides further evidence that these informed, medium-size trades 
from 500 to 9,999 shares have abnormal price impact. Consistent with the stealth trading 
hypothesis, these medium-size trades are not large enough to attract unwarranted attention 
and not small enough that that they are too expensive. Extending this line of research, 
Alexander and Peterson (2007) find evidence that these trades cluster on multiples of 500, 
1,000, and 5,000 shares. Yet, there are times when trades are not clustered. When pressed 
for specific quantities at the end of the quarter, Moulton (2005) explains that investors shy 
away from trade size clustering. More recently, Garvey and Wu (2014) show that trade size 
clustering is less common towards the end of the trading day. They also explain that 
specific size trades are less informed and are more costly. 
From the prior research, the answer to my initial question seems to be a resounding 
yes. It appears that informed traders prefer using medium-sized trades, or at least that was 
the preference. I argue that data selection has an important role in understanding size 
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preference. Barclay and Warner (1993) use data from 1981 to 1984. Chakravarty (2001) 
uses 63 days of trading data from November 1990 to January 1991. Both of these papers 
use data before decimalization, which is a major structural change and it can affect the size 
selection process. Alexander and Peterson (2007) use randomly chosen stock data in 1990, 
1991, 1995, 1998, and 2002. Moulton (2005) uses foreign exchange data from 2001 to 
2002. While their data include 2002 post-decimalization data, the samples are only for one 
year after the conversion, and it was more than a decade ago. I believe that the older data 
may accurately reflect strategies of the past, but traders evolve and their strategies do too. 
Finally, the latest paper, Garvey and Wu (2014) use more recent data from October 1999 
to May 2006, but the data come from one broker/deal firm. For my research, I use TAQ 
data from September 2007 to December 2013. The data sample is naturally more recent 
and is more encompassing as it includes more market participants than the broker/dealer 
firm data. The TAQ data provide the exact timestamp, price, and round, mixed, and odd 
lot quantity of each trade. The data also provide a trader indicator to separate institutional 
from non-institutional transactions.  
Beyond the difference in data selection, I explore how institutional size preference 
differs around corporate announcements and provide evidence that one size does not fit all. 
I examine two different corporate events—share repurchase and earnings announcements. 
The first happens infrequently, and investors are not able to predict in advance if or when 
the firm will make the announcement. The second occurs frequently and, in fact, 
institutions are very aware of the timing of earnings season, and they often perform their 
analysis in advance of the event. This paper empirically tests the theories laid out in 
Verrecchia (2001). The author explains that investors have more incentives to seek private 
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information when they anticipate a news release. Doing so inherently will create an 
environment with higher information asymmetry. Furthermore, as the frequency of the 
news release increases, the intensity of information acquisition will grow. Since round lots 
and trade size clustering are associated with informed trading, I hypothesize that there is a 
difference in how institutional investors trade on the earnings announcement day compared 
to the share repurchase announcement. The difference can highlight the point that 
institutions seek private information when they expect the arrival of new information as in 
earnings announcements. 
Consistent with the theory set by Verrecchia (2001), I observe a difference in 
informed trading in the two event types. Using TAQ intermarket sweep order data, which 
has the exact price, quantity, timestamp, and trader indicator, I find that institutional 
investors use more round lots around earnings announcements than in share repurchase 
announcements. While it is expected that informed institutions would use round lots, they 
appear to use significantly more round lots during earnings announcements than in share 
repurchase announcements. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only study comparing 
the variability in institutional and non-institutional round lot trading around events with 
different frequencies and announcement time predictabilities.  Additionally, I observe a 
change in common trade sizes. While Alexander and Peterson (2007) observe clustering 
on multiples of 500, 1,000, and 5,000 shares, I find that institutions prefer a smaller 100-
share multiple, and the most commonly traded size is 100 shares, which is significantly 
smaller than the medium-size of 500 to 9,999 shares. Finally, the change in common trade 
size multiples to 100 shares has an economic impact. I find that trades in 100-share 
multiples rather than 500x, 1000x, or 5000x are associated with lower bid-ask spreads. I 
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believe the reduction in trading cost could be a compensation for the information 
acquisition process. 
II. Literature Review 
Trade size has important implications because it has been linked to private 
information. Barclay and Warner (1993) find that medium-sized trades between 500 and 
9,900 shares are linked to informed trading and have the highest cumulative effects on 
prices. Their stealth trading hypothesis explains that these profit-maximizing traders 
camouflage their true quantity demand by spreading their trades over time. Chakravarty 
(2001) extends the literature on stealth trading by providing evidence that medium-sized 
trades have the largest price impact and that informed institutions have a preference for 
breaking up large orders especially when trading stocks of large firms. Alexander and 
Peterson (2007) provide additional details on how these stealth traders break up larger 
trades. They slice the total quantity into round, medium-sized orders clustering around 
multiples of 500, 1,000, and 5,000 shares. These round lots appear to have more price 
impact and suggest that stealth traders may want to consider using less costly methods. 
Consistent with previous research, I also find size clustering and institutional preference 
for round lots. However, my findings show that clustering is on a much smaller size in 
multiples of 100 shares. In fact, trade size of 100 shares makes up at least 60 percent of all 
institutional trades. Additionally, I also find evidence of intraday differences in clustering. 
Similar to Garvey and Wu (2014), I observe less clustering towards the end of the trading 
day.  
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My research extends the current literature further by examining the how clustering 
is affected by the frequency and predictability of corporate news releases. I believe that 
clustering is affected by how asymmetrically informed investors trade around material 
events. There are two schools of thoughts on news releases and information asymmetry. 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) explain that the more information is released to the public the 
more opportunities investors have to readjust their positions. Uninformed investors will 
have the opportunity to attain a more optimal portfolio. As the frequency of news releases 
increases, information asymmetry decreases. Fu, Kraft, and Zhang (2012) show that 
increasing the frequency of financial disclosure from semiannually to quarterly can reduce 
information asymmetry and cost of equity. Conversely, in Verrecchia (2001), by assuming 
that the information acquisition process is endogenously endowed, the frequency of 
disclosure is positively associated with information asymmetry. Because institutions have 
the resources and skills to acquire information, higher frequency of disclosures provides 
more opportunities for these traders to benefit from the announcements. The incentive to 
acquire private information, in turn, creates higher information asymmetry. 
In my research, I use share repurchase and earnings announcements as the two 
event types that might affect clustering. The first happens infrequently, and investors are 
not able to predict the timing of the announcements with certainty. The latter occurs 
quarterly, and investors know ahead of time when the announcement is coming. By 
examining trade size clustering around these announcement types, I find that the informed 
traders use more round lots when they expect the news is coming and have time to prepare 
for the announcement. The biggest difference in round lots between the two event types 
occurs during post market hours when most corporate announcements are made.  
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III. Hypotheses 
 My main research question centers around the impact of news disclosure frequency 
on institutional investor’s trade size and clustering preference. Verrecchia (2001) explains 
that the information acquisition process is endogenous and the higher the frequency of 
information disclosure the more investors are incentivized to obtain private information. 
Based on this theory, I believe that the quarterly frequency and predictable timing of 
earnings announcements encourage institutions to acquire information so they can 
optimally rebalance their portfolio every quarter. Conversely, if the institutional investors 
do not know when or if the firm will announce as in share repurchase announcements, there 
is less incentive to acquire private information. Considering that round lots are associated 
with informed trading (Alexander and Peterson 2007), I hypothesize that institutional 
investors will use more round lot trades around earnings announcements because they are 
able to obtain information ahead of the event (H1).  
Additionally, I believe that these round lot trades will cluster around much smaller 
multiples than the previously found 500, 1,000, and 5,000 share-multiples (H2). The trend 
of using smaller sizes has been gaining popularity due to the need to disguise trading 
signals. Since 1995, the average trade size for the NYSE has shrunk from 1,600 to 200 
shares, and due to competition from high-frequency traders, the need to disguise one’s 
trades is becoming more important (Spritzer 2010). Hence, institutional investors may 
break up larger quantities into trades of 100 share-multiples with most trades under 500 
shares to remain undetected.  
Finally, Chakravarty (2001) explains that medium-size trades from 500 to 9,999 
shares initiated by institutional investors have the highest price impact. Next are the large 
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trades at 10,000 shares or more. These trades also move prices although not nearly in the 
same magnitude as medium-size trades. Lastly, small trades from institutions appear to 
have no price impact. Given that there is evidence medium and large trades tend to move 
prices the most, using smaller sizes may be a more cost-effective strategy. Therefore, I 
believe that the smaller size multiples are less costly than the larger size multiples (H3). 
Additionally, it is possible that the market has figured out the camouflage strategy of the 
medium-sized trades. Stealth trading may not be so hidden anymore particularly around 
corporate announcements. 
IV. Data 
To test my hypotheses, I gather data from several sources. My repurchase 
announcement data are from SDC, and my earnings announcement data are from 
Compustat. My main source of institutional data are from TAQ intermarket sweep order 
(ISO) trades. Fully integrated in September 2007, ISOs are limit orders that can sweep 
multiple markets of their liquidity. These orders automatically execute in designated 
markets while simultaneously submitting orders in the market quoting the best prices to 
fulfill Regulation NMS Order Protect Rule. By prioritizing execution speed and order 
fulfillment over price, ISO traders have more opportunities to trades profitably before stock 
prices adjust to new information. ISOs are also associated with more information and are 
mainly used by institutional traders (Chakravarty, Jain, Upson, and Wood 2012). 
Moreover, I utilize ISOs because it provides the exact timestamp, price and round, mixed, 
or odd lot quantity of each institutional trade to determine if institutional investors have a 
size preference. My sample consists of repurchase and earnings announcements of 2,437 
54 
firms from September 2007 when ISOs were fully instated to December 2013. The trades 
are matched based on the firm, year, quarter, and time traded. In total, I examine 
approximately 17.9 million trades for each announcement type.  
V. Findings 
In my exploration of trade size clustering around corporate announcements, I focus 
on the preference of informed traders by examining the trades of ISO institutional 
investors. I look at approximately 17.9 million trades executed by these institutions in both 
earnings and share repurchase announcements. I observe that ISO traders on average use 
smaller trade sizes. The average trade size around earnings announcements is 835 shares, 
and the average for share repurchase announcements is 1,027 shares shown in Table 2-1. 
When I examine the buy and sell trade sizes, I see a similar trend—smaller sizes for 
earnings announcements and larger sizes for share repurchase announcements. It also 
appears that institutional investors prefer using more round lots around earnings 
announcements than around share repurchase announcements. 94.67% of the 17.9 million 
trades executed on the earnings announcement day are round lots. Compared to share 
repurchase announcements, this is approximately 1.87% more round lot or 335,174 more 
round lot trades. Moreover, these round lots appear to be in multiples of 100 shares. I also 
see that the spread is higher around earnings announcement hinting at the possibility that 
traders could be more asymmetrically informed around this type of events. Even before 
examining the matched samples, I observe key differences between earnings and share 
repurchase events. I believe that these differences can be attributed to the frequency and 
predictability of the announcement time. The use of round lots is associated with informed 
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trading (Alexander and Peterson 2007) and I believe that institutions use more round lots 
around earnings announcements because they can obtain private information ahead of the 
scheduled events. 
In Table 2-2, I present the differences in round lots for ISO trades between earnings 
and share repurchase announcements. The trades are matched by the firm, year, quarter, 
and time traded. I divide the sample into several time segments—pre-market time, fifteen-
minute intervals, and post-market time—to show the intraday round lot pattern and to 
highlight the significant difference during the non-market hours when most earnings and 
share repurchase announcement are made. When I rank the differences in round lots 
between earnings and share repurchase announcements from largest to smallest, I see that 
the post-market and pre-market time segments have the larger differences. The differences 
between earnings and repurchase announcements are 4.60%*** in pre-market and 
14.32%*** in the post-market time segments. These differences not only are statistically 
significant, but they are also economically significant. These numbers suggest that 
institutional investors are more informed around earnings announcements than they are 
around share repurchase announcements. Their ability to trade so confidently may come 
from the fact that they are able to utilize their superior research skills ahead of the planned 
announcements. Conversely, when the institutional investors do not know if and when an 
announcement will be made, they are unable to utilize their skills to obtain private 
information. 
When I turn my attention to the liquidity traders, I see that they use fewer round 
lots around earnings announcements. In Table 2-3, I present the differences in round lots 
for NISO traders between earnings and share repurchase announcements. Similar to the 
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ISO trades, the NISO trades are matched by firm, year, quarter, and time traded. Unlike the 
differences observed in the ISO trades, I do not see economically significant differences in 
round lot trading from the liquidity traders. All of the differences are less than a half 
percent. Even more evident is the differences in the pre- and post-market times. They are -
0.15%*** and -0.03%. The first is statistically significant but is not significant 
economically. The second, during the post-market time, is insignificant. These findings 
suggest that liquidity traders are missing the opportunity to obtain better information even 
when the timing of the announcements are predictable like in earnings announcements.  
Hence, I focus on the trade sizes of the ISO traders. Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 present 
the top ten ISO trade sizes around earnings and share repurchase announcements, 
respectively. Accounting for approximately 63.7% of the sample, the most common trade 
size around earnings announcements is 100 shares. This finding is quite different from 
previous research. Garvey and Wu (2014) find that the top five order sizes are 1,000, 500, 
2000, 5,000, and 200. Chakravarty (2001) find that institutions prefer trades of medium 
sizes from 500 to 9,999 shares. The evidence of a smaller trade size point to the need to 
camouflage information around informed events. Stealth trading using medium-sized trade 
may be the best strategy on a day-to-day basis, but around corporate announcements traders 
appear to prefer a trade size of 100 shares. The preference for this particular share size also 
differs between announcement types. Institutional investors use 11.5% fewer 100-share 
trades around share repurchase announcements. This decrease from earnings to share 
repurchase announcements is congruent with how institutions use fewer round lots around 
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share repurchase announcements. So far, I am finding evidence that institutional investors 
prefer using small, round lots4 mostly 100 shares to trade on their private information. 
Using Alexander and Peterson (2007), I provide evidence that clustering around 
informed events is different from the prior research. Table 2-6 reports the regressions of 
the frequency of trade size i on the different size clusters for ISO trades around earnings 
announcements. In the full sample before dividing by the different time segments, I find 
that trades cluster on all four multiples. However, the magnitudes of the clustering vary. In 
the regression with only D100, I find that clustering around 100-share multiples accounts 
for 40.69% of the variations in trade sizes. Compared to 500-share, 1,000-share, and 5,000-
share multiples, which account for only 7.56%, 5.06%, and 2.31% of the variations in size, 
100-share multiples appear to have the most explanatory power. The 100-share multiples 
seem to have economic significance as well as explanatory power. If the trade size is in 
multiples of 100 shares, then the frequency of that size is increased by 1,004.67%***.  
In the multivariate regressions, again, I observe trade size clustering for all 
multiples. Although its economic significance is decreased, 100-share multiples are still 
very relevant. If the trade size is in multiples of 100 shares, then the frequency of that size 
is increased by 619.36%***. For the others multiples, their economic significance is even 
less. For instance, if the trade size is in multiples of 500, 1,000, 5,000 shares, then the 
frequency of that size is increased by only 7.61%***, 42.55%***, and 195.47%***. These 
                                                      
4	In my examination of odd lot trades, I find that institutions prefer using smaller, odd lot sizes around 
earnings announcements than around share repurchase announcements. It appears that institutions prefer 
smaller sizes even with odd lots. The average odd lot size is 39.33 shares.	
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numbers are strong evidence that the clustering trend is different around earnings 
announcement than around the environment of Chakravarty (2001).  
When I divide the full sample into the different time segments, I see that 100-share 
multiples are statistically and economically significant in all of the time periods. There is 
also evidence that institutions are less likely to use larger sizes shown by the negative and 
significant LnSize coefficient. If the trade size is increased by 1%, then the frequency of 
that size being traded is decreased by 245.74%***.  In summary, there is strong evidence 
of clustering around 100-share multiples. 
Finally, I examine how size clustering affects the cost of trading. Table 2-7 presents 
the results of the regression models for the full sample and the different time segments. 
Overall, I see that clustering does affect trading costs. First, 100-share multiples appear to 
reduce the bid-ask spread by approximately $0.0478***, 500-share multiples increase the 
spread by $0.0138***, 1,000-share multiples decrease the spread by $0.0314***, and the 
5,000-share multiples increase the spread by $0.1885***. Although in the full sample the 
1,000-share multiples appear to reduce the spread, I see mixed results in the time-
segmented regressions. Most importantly, I see that during the post-market hours, when 
firms announce earnings, all multiples except D100 increase the cost of trading. Overall, it 
appears that clustering around 100-share multiples is a good strategy to lower trading costs. 
VI. Conclusion 
Assuming that the process of information acquisition is endogenously endowed, I 
explore how the frequency of corporate announcements affect institutional trading. By 
comparing earnings announcements, which occur every quarter, with share repurchase 
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announcements, which happen non-routinely and are unpredictable, I find that institutional 
investors are more motivated to obtain private information around earnings 
announcements. Institutions use more round lot trades, which are associated with informed 
trading, around earnings announcements than around repurchase announcements. In 
contrasts, the liquidity traders do not display any economic differences between the two 
announcement types. It appears that the information acquisition process for these NISO 
traders is the same for both earnings and share repurchase announcements. I believe the 
difference between ISO and NISO traders is due to the institution’s ability to acquire 
private information, especially around an event that they know is coming.  
Furthermore, I observe a change in trade size preference around corporate 
announcements. The most common trade size is 100 shares, which is much smaller than 
the previously known medium-size preference. The shift in smaller size preference is also 
associated with lower trading cost for institutional investors. These findings imply that 
traders have many tools in the shed. They pick and choose which tool is most appropriate 
for the job. In some cases, a small chisel is better than a hammer. 
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Table 2-1 
Descriptive Statistics for Earnings & Share Repurchase Announcements 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for trade size clustering and prices around earnings and share 
repurchase announcements. The events are matched by firm, year, quarter, and time traded. N is the number 
of trades matched for the two events. 
 
 Earnings Announcements Share Repurchase Announcements 
 Mean N Mean N 
Size 835 17,923,752 1,027 17,923,752 
Shares Bought 812 8,623,958 975 8,591,729 
Shares Sold 850 8,636,564 1,082 8,650,151 
Round Lot 94.67% 17,923,752 92.80% 17,923,752 
Mix Lot 5.30% 17,923,752 7.01% 17,923,752 
Odd Lot 0.03% 17,923,752 0.19% 17,923,752 
D100 94.67% 17,923,752 92.80% 17,923,752 
D500 4.91% 17,923,752 7.70% 17,923,752 
D1000 2.22% 17,923,752 3.44% 17,923,752 
D5000 0.46% 17,923,752 0.75% 17,923,752 
Ask $ 47.17 17,923,752 $ 47.06 17,923,752 
Bid $ 47.06 17,923,752 $ 46.97 17,923,752 
Buy Price $ 47.35 8,623,958 $ 47.30 8,591,729 
Sell Price $ 47.93 8,636,564 $ 48.05 8,650,151 
Spread $  0.11 17,923,752 $  0.09 17,923,752 
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Table 2-2 
Differences in ISO Round Lots between Earnings & Share Repurchase Announcements 
This table presents the differences in round lots for ISO trades between earnings and share repurchase 
announcements. The events are matched by firm, year, quarter, and time traded. N is the number of trades 
matched for the two events. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
N 
Earnings 
Announcement 
Round Lot 
Share Repurchase 
Announcement 
Round Lot 
Difference p-value 
 
Pre-market 164,638 88.36% 83.76% 4.60%*** <.0001 
09:30 AM - 09:45 AM 1,514,406 92.27% 89.48% 2.79%*** <.0001 
09:45 AM - 10:00 AM 1,235,931 95.42% 93.51% 1.91%*** <.0001 
10:00 AM - 10:15 AM 1,062,593 94.19% 92.28% 1.91%*** <.0001 
10:15 AM - 10:30 AM 861,738 94.87% 94.47% 0.39%*** <.0001 
10:30 AM - 10:45 AM 803,933 95.96% 94.50% 1.46%*** <.0001 
10:45 AM - 11:00 AM 680,415 95.02% 93.99% 1.03%*** <.0001 
11:00 AM - 11:15 AM 652,070 95.36% 93.42% 1.94%*** <.0001 
11:15 AM - 11:30 AM 600,149 96.19% 92.93% 3.26%*** <.0001 
11:30 AM - 11:45 AM 572,869 94.09% 92.44% 1.65%*** <.0001 
11:45 AM - 12:00 PM 510,499 95.38% 94.67% 0.72%*** <.0001 
12:00 PM - 12:15 PM 470,795 95.69% 94.96% 0.73%*** <.0001 
12:15 PM - 12:30 PM 428,688 94.85% 94.22% 0.64%*** <.0001 
12:30 PM - 12:45 PM 411,143 95.43% 94.54% 0.89%*** <.0001 
12:45 PM - 01:00 PM 381,465 95.25% 94.56% 0.69%*** <.0001 
01:00 PM - 01:15 PM 409,821 95.32% 95.13% 0.19%*** <.0001 
01:15 PM - 01:30 PM 397,734 95.71% 94.87% 0.84%*** <.0001 
01:30 PM - 01:45 PM 424,863 95.61% 94.10% 1.51%*** <.0001 
01:45 PM - 02:00 PM 440,502 95.08% 94.87% 0.21%*** <.0001 
02:00 PM - 02:15 PM 486,232 94.12% 94.29% -0.17%*** 0.0002 
02:15 PM - 02:30 PM 518,823 96.10% 95.69% 0.41%*** <.0001 
02:30 PM - 02:45 PM 508,459 95.97% 93.91% 2.06%*** <.0001 
02:45 PM - 03:00 PM 539,907 96.84% 94.58% 2.26%*** <.0001 
03:00 PM - 03:15 PM 649,652 96.17% 94.07% 2.10%*** <.0001 
03:15 PM - 03:30 PM 676,752 95.00% 94.73% 0.27%*** <.0001 
03:30 PM - 03:45 PM 839,375 94.64% 93.27% 1.37%*** <.0001 
03:45 PM - 04:00 PM 1,284,644 92.51% 89.17% 3.35%*** <.0001 
Post-market 395,656 90.47% 76.16% 14.32%*** <.0001 
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Table 2-3 
Differences in NISO Round Lots between Earnings & Share Repurchase Announcements 
This table presents the differences in round lots for NISO trades between earnings and share repurchase 
announcements. The events are matched by firm, year, quarter, and time traded. N is the number of trades 
matched for the two events. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
N 
Earnings 
Announcement 
Round Lot 
Share Repurchase 
Announcement Round 
Lot 
Difference p-value  
Pre-market 27,269 92.91% 93.06% -0.15%*** <.0001 
09:30 AM - 09:45 AM 379,841 96.14% 96.30% -0.17%*** <.0001 
09:45 AM - 10:00 AM 301,163 96.95% 97.18% -0.23%*** <.0001 
10:00 AM - 10:15 AM 252,994 96.60% 97.02% -0.42%*** <.0001 
10:15 AM - 10:30 AM 216,792 97.15% 97.19% -0.04%*** 0.0002 
10:30 AM - 10:45 AM 193,846 97.11% 97.09% 0.02%* 0.0634 
10:45 AM - 11:00 AM 163,445 96.73% 96.92% -0.19%*** <.0001 
11:00 AM - 11:15 AM 156,821 96.82% 97.04% -0.21%*** <.0001 
11:15 AM - 11:30 AM 144,885 97.15% 97.09% 0.06%*** 0.0008 
11:30 AM - 11:45 AM 133,743 96.85% 97.05% -0.19%*** <.0001 
11:45 AM - 12:00 PM 123,908 96.59% 97.02% -0.43%*** <.0001 
12:00 PM - 12:15 PM 115,366 96.80% 97.08% -0.28%*** <.0001 
12:15 PM - 12:30 PM 110,148 96.85% 96.88% -0.03% 0.1515 
12:30 PM - 12:45 PM 104,994 96.61% 97.00% -0.39%*** <.0001 
12:45 PM - 01:00 PM 97,085 96.55% 96.78% -0.23%*** <.0001 
01:00 PM - 01:15 PM 101,390 96.66% 96.89% -0.24%*** <.0001 
01:15 PM - 01:30 PM 99,135 96.90% 96.98% -0.09%*** <.0001 
01:30 PM - 01:45 PM 109,759 96.46% 96.88% -0.42%*** <.0001 
01:45 PM - 02:00 PM 114,003 96.87% 96.99% -0.12%*** <.0001 
02:00 PM - 02:15 PM 120,283 96.60% 96.78% -0.18%*** <.0001 
02:15 PM - 02:30 PM 128,882 96.68% 96.87% -0.18%*** <.0001 
02:30 PM - 02:45 PM 132,965 97.03% 97.17% -0.14%*** <.0001 
02:45 PM - 03:00 PM 134,782 96.72% 97.06% -0.35%*** <.0001 
03:00 PM - 03:15 PM 163,103 96.69% 97.04% -0.35%*** <.0001 
03:15 PM - 03:30 PM 182,090 96.83% 96.93% -0.10%*** <.0001 
03:30 PM - 03:45 PM 238,033 96.87% 96.90% -0.03%** 0.0458 
03:45 PM - 04:00 PM 396,873 95.57% 95.80% -0.23%*** <.0001 
Post-market 85,646 89.16% 89.20% -0.03% 0.2317 
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Table 2-4 
Earnings Announcements Top 10 ISO Sizes 
This table reports the top ten ISO trade sizes around earnings announcements. 
SIZE COUNT PERCENT 
100 11,421,801 63.7 
200 1,836,801 10.2 
300 728,602 4.1 
400 456,567 2.5 
500 329,063 1.8 
600 188,222 1.1 
1,000 171,010 1.0 
700 142,692 0.8 
800 138,508 0.8 
900 131,645 0.7 
Other 2,378,841 13.3 
Total 17,923,752 100.0 
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Table 2-5 
Share Repurchase Announcements Top 10 ISO Sizes 
This table reports the top ten ISO trade sizes around share repurchase announcements. 
SIZE COUNT PERCENT 
100 9,355,977 52.2 
200 1,723,275 9.6 
300 812,550 4.5 
400 589,811 3.3 
500 495,298 2.8 
600 344,777 1.9 
1,000 289,912 1.6 
700 285,170 1.6 
800 258,573 1.4 
900 208,233 1.2 
Other 3,560,176 19.9 
Total 17,923,752 100.0 
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Table 2-6 
Intraday Intermarket Sweep Order Trade Size Clustering for Earnings Announcements 
This table reports the regression of LnFreq on the different size clusters for ISO trades around earnings announcements.  !"#$%&' = ) + +,--.100 +	+2--.500 +	+,,---.1000 +	+2,---.5000 + !"567%' 	+ 	8' 
I estimate a regression following Alexander and Peterson (2007). LnFreq is the natural log of the percentage of trades that are of size i. D100, D500, D1000, 
and D5000 are dummy variables set to one if size i is a multiple of 100, 500, 1,000, or 5,000 shares, zero otherwise. LnSize is the natural log of the trade size 
i in shares. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 N D100 D500 D1000 D5000 LnSize Intercept Adjusted R-Square 
All time segments   17,923,752  10.0467***     -7.2231*** 0.4069 
All time segments   17,923,752   -4.5002***    2.5093*** 0.0756 
All time segments   17,923,752    -5.3996***   2.4080*** 0.0506 
All time segments   17,923,752     -7.9222***  2.3248*** 0.0231 
All time segments   17,923,752      -2.7599*** 16.8229*** 0.8354 
All time segments   17,923,752  6.1936*** 0.0761*** 0.4255*** 1.9547*** -2.4574*** 9.3444*** 0.9837 
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 N D100 D500 D1000 D5000 LnSize Intercept Adjusted R-Square 
Pre-market 164,638 5.1460*** 0.7793*** 0.9855*** 1.2446*** -1.9953*** 7.9767*** 0.9808 
09:30 AM - 09:45 AM 1,514,406 6.0617*** -0.2067*** 0.5587*** 1.9117*** -2.2874*** 8.6381*** 0.9843 
09:45 AM - 10:00 AM 1,235,931 6.2222*** -0.0571*** 0.5006*** 2.3598*** -2.4051*** 9.0687*** 0.9828 
10:00 AM - 10:15 AM 1,062,593 6.5572*** 0.0839*** 0.5401*** 2.3115*** -2.5073*** 9.2428*** 0.9922 
10:15 AM - 10:30 AM 861,738 6.3795*** 0.0289*** 0.5325*** 1.8370*** -2.4901*** 9.3303*** 0.9857 
10:30 AM - 10:45 AM 803,933 6.2751*** 0.1768*** 0.4188*** 4.3071*** -2.5483*** 9.7143*** 0.9879 
10:45 AM - 11:00 AM 680,415 6.3907*** 0.0284*** 0.4497*** 1.4765*** -2.4974*** 9.3582*** 0.9873 
11:00 AM - 11:15 AM 652,070 6.2689*** 0.0672*** 0.5887*** 1.3366*** -2.5276*** 9.6217*** 0.9864 
11:15 AM - 11:30 AM 600,149 6.5422*** 0.1361*** 0.4806*** 1.9157*** -2.5524*** 9.4808*** 0.9889 
11:30 AM - 11:45 AM 572,869 5.9013*** -0.0720*** 0.5261*** 1.2385*** -2.4168*** 9.4353*** 0.9837 
11:45 AM - 12:00 PM 510,499 6.2197*** -0.0015*** 0.4437*** 1.4261*** -2.5237*** 9.6504*** 0.9842 
12:00 PM - 12:15 PM 470,795 6.1919*** 0.0142*** 0.4802*** 1.3537*** -2.4924*** 9.5204*** 0.9824 
12:15 PM - 12:30 PM 428,688 6.7422*** 0.120*** 0.3955*** 3.0634*** -2.5302*** 9.1646*** 0.9890 
12:30 PM - 12:45 PM 411,143 6.5211*** 0.0760*** 0.5256*** 3.2996*** -2.6041*** 9.7487*** 0.9881 
12:45 PM - 01:00 PM 381,465 6.4906*** -0.0997*** 0.6715*** 1.7979*** -2.5201*** 9.3686*** 0.9856 
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 N D100 D500 D1000 D5000 LnSize Intercept Adjusted R-Square 
01:00 PM - 01:15 PM 409,821 6.4951*** 0.1300*** 0.3427*** 1.4175*** -2.5780*** 9.6465*** 0.9909 
01:15 PM - 01:30 PM 397,734 6.2281*** -0.0208*** 0.4434*** 1.1954*** -2.4686*** 9.3609*** 0.9762 
01:30 PM - 01:45 PM 424,863 6.3700*** 0.0330*** 0.5138*** 1.3657*** -2.5155*** 9.4482*** 0.9809 
01:45 PM - 02:00 PM 440,502 6.5646*** 0.1267*** 0.5592*** 2.0496*** -2.5784*** 9.5787*** 0.9916 
02:00 PM - 02:15 PM 486,232 6.3057*** 0.0639*** 0.5036*** 3.1296*** -2.5403*** 9.6448*** 0.9898 
02:15 PM - 02:30 PM 518,823 6.5762*** 0.1288*** 0.5330*** 2.2802*** -2.6122*** 9.7335*** 0.9916 
02:30 PM - 02:45 PM 508,459 6.5223*** 0.1095*** 0.5052*** 2.0753*** -2.5811*** 9.6339*** 0.9904 
02:45 PM - 03:00 PM 539,907 6.9944*** -0.0692*** 0.5363*** 1.9325*** -2.5298*** 8.9196*** 0.9907 
03:00 PM - 03:15 PM 649,652 6.4581*** 0.1127*** 0.4917*** 1.2533*** -2.5967*** 9.7701*** 0.9908 
03:15 PM - 03:30 PM 676,752 6.1955*** 0.0312*** 0.4275*** 1.8672*** -2.5342*** 9.7224*** 0.9877 
03:30 PM - 03:45 PM 839,375 6.2227*** 0.0027*** 0.3236*** 1.9692*** -2.4940*** 9.5015*** 0.9903 
03:45 PM - 04:00 PM 1,284,644 6.0488*** -0.0122*** 0.4109*** 0.9435*** -2.3875*** 9.1221*** 0.9886 
Post-market 395,656 5.2677*** 0.4071*** 0.8693*** 0.4774*** -2.1309*** 8.5840*** 0.9691 
 
 Table 2-7 
Intraday Intermarket Sweep Order Trade Size Clustering and the Bid-Ask Spread for Earnings Announcements 
This table reports the regression of the bid-ask spread on the different trade size clusters for ISO trades.  59$%:;' = ) + +,--.100 +	+2--.500 +	+,,---.1000 +	+2,---.5000 + !"567%' 	+ 	8' 
I estimate a regression following Alexander and Peterson (2007). The Spread is calculated as the difference between the bid and ask prices. D100, D500, 
D1000, and D5000 are dummy variables set to one if size i is a multiple of 100, 500, 1,000, or 5,000 shares, zero otherwise. LnSize is the natural log of the 
trade size i in shares. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 N D100 D500 D1000 D5000 LnSize Intercept Adjusted R-Square 
All time segments 17,923,752 -0.0478*** 0.0138*** -0.0314*** 0.1885*** -0.0022*** 0.1642*** 0.0041 
         
         
 N D100 D500 D1000 D5000 LnSize Intercept Adjusted R-Square 
Pre-market 164,638 -0.1709*** 0.0650*** -0.1235*** -0.0920*** 0.0015*** 0.3710*** 0.0396 
09:30 AM - 09:45 AM 1,514,406 -0.2667*** 0.0179*** -0.0506*** -0.1436*** 0.0128*** 0.3673*** 0.0538 
09:45 AM - 10:00 AM 1,235,931 -0.0049*** -0.1033*** -0.0168*** -0.0604*** 0.0263*** 0.0053*** 0.0121 
10:00 AM - 10:15 AM 1,062,593 -0.0142*** -0.0030* 0.0311*** -0.0394*** -0.0147*** 0.2014*** 0.0041 
10:15 AM - 10:30 AM 861,738 0.0041*** -0.0175*** -0.0222*** -0.0097** -0.0095*** 0.1523*** 0.0045 
10:30 AM - 10:45 AM 803,933 0.0188*** -0.0007 0.0044* 0.1395*** -0.0039*** 0.1039*** 0.0013 
10:45 AM - 11:00 AM 680,415 -0.0023* 0.0371*** -0.0690*** 0.0129*** -0.0113*** 0.1593*** 0.0045 
11:00 AM - 11:15 AM 652,070 -0.0027** -0.0068*** -0.0157*** 0.0028 -0.0123*** 0.1591*** 0.0055 
11:15 AM - 11:30 AM 600,149 -0.0266*** 0.0534*** -0.0722*** -0.0321*** -0.0071*** 0.1638*** 0.0029 
11:30 AM - 11:45 AM 572,869 -0.0082*** 0.0124*** -0.0239*** 0.0014 -0.0163*** 0.1864*** 0.0097 
11:45 AM - 12:00 PM 510,499 0.0007 0.0310*** 0.0098*** -0.0542*** -0.0171*** 0.1798*** 0.0075 
12:00 PM - 12:15 PM 470,795 -0.0136*** -0.0099*** 0.0151*** 0.0217*** -0.0167*** 0.1891*** 0.0079 
12:15 PM - 12:30 PM 428,688 -0.0848*** 0.0170*** 0.0455*** 0.2732*** -0.0132*** 0.2426*** 0.0354 
12:30 PM - 12:45 PM 411,143 0.0100*** -0.0098*** -0.0066** 0.1471*** -0.0143*** 0.1521*** 0.0075 
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 N D100 D500 D1000 D5000 LnSize Intercept Adjusted R-Square 
12:45 PM - 01:00 PM 381,465 -0.0167*** 0.0856*** -0.1252*** 0.0040 0.0036*** 0.0907*** 0.0078 
01:00 PM - 01:15 PM 409,821 0.0484*** -0.0330*** -0.0830*** -0.0233** 0.0194*** -0.0507*** 0.0087 
01:15 PM - 01:30 PM 397,734 0.0850*** -0.0702*** -0.0482*** -0.0877*** 0.0293*** -0.1302*** 0.0176 
01:30 PM - 01:45 PM 424,863 0.0138*** -0.0195*** -0.0022 -0.0134* -0.0049*** 0.0985*** 0.0019 
01:45 PM - 02:00 PM 440,502 0.0092*** 0.0436*** 0.1448*** 1.7496*** -0.0103*** 0.1307*** 0.5452 
02:00 PM - 02:15 PM 486,232 -0.1719*** -0.0172*** -0.0171*** -0.0280*** -0.0026*** 0.2735*** 0.0334 
02:15 PM - 02:30 PM 518,823 0.0073*** -0.0179*** -0.0126*** -0.0013 -0.0072*** 0.1221*** 0.0037 
02:30 PM - 02:45 PM 508,459 -0.0035** 0.0288*** -0.0417*** -0.0010 -0.0141*** 0.1599*** 0.0072 
02:45 PM - 03:00 PM 539,907 0.0072*** 0.1586*** -0.1420*** -0.0580*** -0.0070*** 0.1215*** 0.0156 
03:00 PM - 03:15 PM 649,652 -0.0007 -0.0190*** 0.0343*** 0.8515*** -0.0096*** 0.1371*** 0.0940 
03:15 PM - 03:30 PM 676,752 -0.0011 -0.0119*** 0.0099*** 0.0062** -0.0098*** 0.1345*** 0.0038 
03:30 PM - 03:45 PM 839,375 -0.0013 0.0389*** -0.0357*** -0.0097 -0.0125*** 0.1409*** 0.0063 
03:45 PM - 04:00 PM 1,284,644 -0.0004 0.0248*** -0.0374*** -0.0057 -0.0080*** 0.1234*** 0.0031 
Post-market 395,656 -0.0405*** 0.0612*** 0.0115*** -0.0023 -0.0244*** 0.3626*** 0.0050 
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CHAPTER 3: CEO VS. PRESIDENT—MARKET PERCEPTION OF CROSS-BORDER 
M&A ANNOUNCEMENT BASED ON INSIDER TRADING 
I. Introduction 
The information hierarchy hypothesis explains that the quality of information 
possess by the insiders depends on their role within the firm (Nunn, Madden, and Gombola, 
1983; Seyhun 1986). At the bottom of the corporate pyramid, large shareholders’ trades 
are the least informative. Above the larger shareholders are the directors and officers, who 
are largely more informed and on average earn higher returns than the large shareholders. 
At the apex, the top executives, who account for approximately a quarter of insider trades, 
earn the highest return of all insiders. These top insiders earn five percent return over a 
twelve-month period, and their profitability is seven times that of the large shareholders 
(Seyhun 2000).  
Considering that the top executives are more informed than the others, their trades 
may have stronger signaling power to outsiders. In my study, I look at how insider 
transactions, specifically the trading activities of the CEO and president, prior to merger 
and acquisition (M&A) announcement can impact the post-announcement return. This 
research is an empirical test of the information hierarchy hypothesis examining the insiders 
at the very top of the corporate pyramid. Is there a difference in signaling power between 
the two titans—the CEO and the president? M&A announcements provide a good 
environment to study top insider trading signals because of the chatter and rumors 
surrounding the event. It has been documented that talks of M&A start six months prior to 
the announcement (Agrawal and Nasser 2012). During this period, interested parties will 
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seek information, and they may look to the CEO and president for signals because insider 
purchases usually result in positive abnormal returns (Lin and Howe 1990; Chang and Suk 
1998). 
My study is different from the existing literature in two main aspects. First, my 
research looks at the insiders of the acquirers while prior research largely focuses on the 
insiders of the target firms. Agrawal and Jaffe (1995) examine the effectiveness of the SEC 
Rule 16-b short-swing rule, which states that all profits must be returned to the firm if the 
trades were executed six months before the announcement of a material event. They find 
that the target insiders’ purchases dropped significantly six months before the merger 
announcement.  Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (2000) find that target firm’s abnormal 
return before merger announcements is due to insider trading. In Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012), they find that target insiders use a passive, net purchasing strategy before takeover 
announcements, and the directors’ and officers’ level of passive net purchases increase by 
50% during the six-month, pre-announcement period.  
I focus on the acquirers rather than the targets to provide insights into the trading 
behavior of the executives, who are responsible for the M&A from inception to completion. 
The acquirer executives are the people who establish the motives for the transaction, select 
the target, estimate target value, choose the method of payment, and ensure the success of 
the company after the merger or acquisition. Therefore, their pre-announcement trades 
would have more information relative to those of the target executives considering that the 
acquirer executives do most of the pre-announcement planning. I also focus on the 
acquirers because most target executives leave the organization within one year of the 
completion of the M&A (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack 2004). They also find that the half 
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of the target CEOs do not become officers of the acquiring firm and very few become top 
executives. Only 15 target CEOs out of 311 become the presidents in the acquiring firm. 
By examining the acquirer executives, I am avoiding potential biases from the target 
executives’ exit strategy.   
Secondly, my study differs from the prior research because I examine trades by 
both the CEO and the president. This delineation is important because these top insiders 
play different roles within the corporation. In most cases, the CEO is the highest ranking 
officer in the company and the president is second in command. The CEO is responsible 
for the strategies and visions of the firm. The president manages the day-to-day 
operations—setting goals, developing policies, and monitoring performance. In a merger, 
both of the acquirer CEO and president are needed to ensure the transaction will be 
successful. Nevertheless, the spotlight is mostly on the CEO as shown by the prior 
literature. Researchers have looked at personal characteristics of CEOs related to M&A. 
Rovenpor (1993) explains that CEOs who believe that bigger is better, who need power, 
and are self-confident, are more likely to engage in M&A activities. Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) find that overconfident CEOs overpay for target firms, and Lehn and Zhao (2006) 
find that CEOs who make bad acquisitions are more likely to be replaced within five years. 
Researchers also look at the positive effects of mergers on CEO compensation (Bliss and 
Rosen 2001), the positive relationship between CEO age and the likelihood of making 
diversifying acquisitions (Serfling 2014), and the positive impact of CEO network on 
M&A (El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik 2015). Considering that the president is as involved 
in M&A activities, he deserves some of the spotlights as well, and it would be interesting 
to find that investors value the president net purchases over those of the CEO. The results 
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could provide evidence for or against the information hierarchy hypothesis at the top of the 
corporate pyramid. To my knowledge, this comparison between the CEO and president has 
not been analyzed.  
In the study, I find that CEO net purchases before the announcement are mostly 
ignored, and net purchases made by the president during the six months before the 
announcement have more impact on post-announcement returns. These results suggest that 
the market values the trading signals of the president more than the CEO’s, perhaps, 
because of his hands-on experience and knowledge of the specific division within the 
corporation involved in the merger. My study also provides additional insight on CEO-
president duality. The trades of a president who is also the CEO of the firm have either 
negative effects or no significant impact on the post-announcement returns. However, the 
net purchases of a president who does not concurrently hold the CEO title have the 
strongest positive impact. My findings are consistent with the existing literature that 
executive duality have negative effects on the firm. Harris and Helfat (1998) relate that a 
CEO, who is also the Chair of the Board and president tend to have poor succession 
planning and does not have the ability to guide the firm successfully after the incumbent 
chief executive leaves. Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson (1997) find that when a firm has a 
CEO with all three titles the firm stock performance suffers.  
II. Literature Review 
The existing literature on M&A examines stock returns around the announcement 
time and concludes that overall acquiring firms do not benefit from their acquisitions. King, 
Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) find 
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negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for acquirers and positive CARs for targets. 
Similarly, Hackbarth and Mrellec (2008) find that the 3-day CARs using a 90-day 
estimation window around the announcement date for acquirers and targets are -0.52% and 
18.21%, respectively. Both CARs are significant at the 1% level.  
However, in cross-border mergers, there is mix evidence of abnormal returns. Bris 
and Cabolis (2008) find significant buy-and-hold abnormal returns in cross-border M&A. 
However, the results are not as robust showing a positive buy-and-hold median abnormal 
return and a negative buy-and-hold mean abnormal return. Additionally, Aybar and Ficici 
(2009) examine 433 cross-border merger announcements from 58 emerging-market 
multinationals (EMM) in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Using different event windows, 
the authors find that the mean CAR for the acquirer ±1 day from the announcement is -
0.09% and significant at the 5% level. They find that this value destruction comes from 
acquiring targets in the same industry. These firms did not reap the benefits of 
diversification. Conversely, Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor (2010) find that all 
cross-border M&A have an average CAR of 2.58% using an 11-day window. They argue 
that emerging firms benefit from cross-border M&A especially with targets in developed 
economies because of better capabilities and higher quality of resources. These tangible 
and intangible advantages take time to develop, so emerging firms are better off acquiring 
these resources.  
Since there is such ambiguity in returns for cross-border mergers, investors may 
turn to registered insiders for trading signals. Prior research shows that insider transactions 
around mergers provide valuable information to investors. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) 
explore the information leakage of impending M&A. They explain that twelve days before 
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the first announcement insider trading behavior exhibits nonrandom patterns at the 2% 
significance level. Using a testing window of (-18, 10), they find a CAR of 27.042% with 
93% of the return cumulated up to the day of the announcement. Overall, they find a 
significant CAR for target firms around announcement time. They argue that the significant 
and abnormal CAR is the result of the poorly kept M&A secrets. Then, in Agrawal and 
Jaffe (1995), they examine the effects of Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act, which 
discourage managers from trading on private information before M&A, on the target firm’s 
insider trading pattern. They find that insider purchases decrease significantly before the 
announcement although pre-announcement sales do not decrease. Meanwhile, the firm 
experience 11.75% abnormal return over months (-3, 0). Comparing the results of Keown 
and Pinkerton (1981) with that of Argawal and Jaffe (1995), it is clear that the insider’s 
restraint is due largely to the effective enforcement of insider trading regulations. In a 
following paper, Agrawal and Nasser (2012) explain that insiders of 3700 targets reduce 
their purchases below normal levels and decrease their sales even more. This passive 
trading strategy leads to a 50% increase in dollar value of net purchases for targets’ officers 
and directors in the 6-month pre-announcement period. Again, the passive trading strategy 
is evidence of effective enforcement of insider trading regulations.  
Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (2000) describe the relationship between pre-bid 
price run-ups in target share prices and insider trading. They explain that the run-ups before 
the announcement are largely due to insider trading. However, the immediate run-ups are 
associated with the market excitement associated with takeover threats. With an estimation 
window of (-255, -80) and event window of (-60, 25) the authors find a CAAR of 14.05%. 
Similar to previous studies, they find insider net selling around the time of the 
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announcement. Luo (2005) find that insiders gauge the market reaction to complete M&A. 
The deals are more sensitive to the market’s opinion when the company announces before 
signing a definitive contract, the companies are not in the high-tech industries, and the 
companies are small or mid-cap. Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) study the U.K. 
market reaction to insider transactions around announcements, including M&A. Insider 
buys and sales trigger a 3.12% and -0.37% 2-day returns. The higher the number of insiders 
participating in trading before the announcement the stronger the impact. They find no 
information hierarchy, which means the CEO does not have superior information relative 
to a blockholder. Acharya and Johnson (2010) construct models to measure the likelihood 
of insider activity before private-equity buyout bid announcement. Under lax regulations, 
the higher the number of insiders the higher the level of insider trading.  
III. Hypotheses 
The information hierarchy hypothesis explains that top executive trades have more 
information than those of all others (Seyhun 1986, 2000). If the hypothesis proves true, 
then CEO net purchases should have the most impact on the post-announcement return 
(H1). The CEO is the highest ranking officer and can make strategic changes. Therefore, 
it would not be surprising if the CEO trading activities are closely monitored and followed 
by investors, especially around corporate announcements that can change the future of the 
company. 
Similarly, the president of the firm has broad control over the daily operations and 
is in-tune with the business. Hence, the president net purchases should also have a 
significant impact on post-announcement stock return albeit not as strong as the CEO’s 
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(H2). If investors pay more attention to the president than the CEO, it would imply that 
they value insights from the executive with more hands-on experience working with 
suppliers and customers. It would also suggest that the information hierarchy hypothesis 
does not hold at the very top of the corporate ladder. 
Finally, in some firms, the roles between the CEO and president are merged where 
one person assumes both titles. In this CEO-president duality scenario, the net purchases 
by the CEO-president should have a profound impact on the post-announcement return 
(H3). After all, this person makes the strategic decision to merge and ensures that the target 
is folded into the firm without impacting the current businesses.  
IV. Data 
To test my hypotheses, I use several data sources. The merger data come from the 
Securities Data Company. Insider trading from Thomson Reuters and pricing data from 
CRSP. The sample contains more than 10,300 cross-border mergers of 2,051 acquirers 
from 1986 to 2014. Approximately, 91.97 percent of the mergers are friendly. Less than 
one percent is unsolicited or of a hostile nature. On average, these acquirers seek 87 percent 
of the target and acquire 82.5 percent. The top ten target countries are United Kingdom, 
Canada, Germany, France, Australia, India, Italy, Brazil, China, and Mexico. In total, they 
make up 64 percent of the sample M&A announcements as shown in Figure 3-1.  
V. Findings 
Since 1986, U.S. firms are increasingly looking outside the border for valuable 
targets. The percentage of cross-border mergers has climbed steadily from four percent of 
mergers to as high as 24 percent in 2013 shown in Figure 3-2. In contrast, domestic mergers 
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have gone down from 96 percent to as low as 76 percent. This difference highlights the 
importance of the changing M&A environment. As cross-border mergers grow in 
importance so do their impact on the stock market. Besides its increasing popularity, I also 
chose to study insider trading around cross-border mergers because of the added risk 
factors, ranging from political to cultural issues. Despite the challenges faced by the 
acquirer, it appears that cross-border mergers do not always result in negative returns. 
Table 3-1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of cross-border and domestic 
mergers. As reported in the table, domestic mergers tend to result in significant losses for 
the acquirer. Conversely, in cross-border mergers, the CAARs are not so clear. There are 
both positive and negative returns with varying levels of significance. Additionally, around 
cross-border mergers CEO and president trading patterns seem to differ. The CEOs are net 
sellers while the presidents are net buyers during the twelve months around the 
announcement. Hence, cross-border mergers provide an interesting testing environment for 
the impact of insider trading on post-announcement returns.  
In my assessment of insider trading impact on post-announcement returns, I 
estimated several models. The first set of models evaluation the trades of the president and 
CEO. The control variables for all models are the net purchases of all insiders, the Fama-
French three factors plus momentum, year dummies, and industry dummies. Table 3-2 
reports the regression results for all seventeen models. Model 1 – 4 look at the president 
net purchases during the months prior to the announcements. The results show that the 
president net purchases during months [-3, 0] and [-6, -3] have significant and positive 
impact on the post-announcement return. Economically, for every one percent increase in 
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net purchases by the president during months [-3, 0] and [-6, -3], the three-month, post-
announcement return increases by 3.44%** and 4.96%***, respectively.  
When I look at the CEO trades impact in Model 5 – 8, I see that CEO trades during 
months [-3, 0] relative to the announcement have a negative but insignificant impact on the 
post-announcement return. During months [-6, -3], president net purchases actually 
increase return. A one percent increase in CEO net purchases can increase return by 
3.71%***. CEO trades during months [-9, -6] have negative, but insignificant impact 
similar to the three months prior to the announcement. Months [-12, -9] positively influence 
return but the impact in insignificant. Overall, CEO impact on return is rather inconsistent 
and not as strong as the president’s. In Model 9-16, the president and CEO trades are 
controlled by the trades of all insiders during the twelve months prior to the announcement. 
Even with these added variables, the president net purchases are still significant. A one 
percent increase in the president net purchases during months [-3, 0], [-6, -3], and [-12, -9] 
can increase the post-announcement return by 4.47%**, 8.40%***, and 3.38%*, 
respectively.  In contrast, when the net purchases of all insiders are added to the models, 
the impact of CEO net purchases during months [-6, -3] appears to reduce in magnitude 
from the initial 3.71%*** to 2.87%*. Not only is there a reduction of almost one percent 
but also a reduction in significance level. Again, similar to the findings in Model 1 – 4, 
president trades are largely still significant. Finally, in Model 17, I evaluate the net trading 
of all players. It appears that the president net purchases during the six months prior to the 
announcement can increase the post-announcement return by 5.18%** in months [-3, 0] 
and 8.50%*** in months [-6, -3]. A one percent increase in the CEO net purchases during 
the three-months prior to the announcement can reduce return by 3.50%*. Overall, there is 
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evidence that the market response positively to the net purchases by the president, 
especially when these trades are executed during a time that these top executive are 
subjected to the SEC six-month, short-swing profit rule.  
Table 3-3 reports the impact of insider trading on the six-month, post-announcement 
returns. Using the same models, I find that the president net purchases have significant and 
positive impact on returns. A one percent increase in net purchases by the president can 
increase return by 6.13%** during months [-3, 0] and 11.13%*** during months [-6, -3]. 
It appears that the president trades during months [-9, -6] have a negative impact on return. 
I argue that these trades fall outside of the SEC short-swing, six-month period, and, hence, 
the market does not trust signals from these transactions. On the other hand, the CEO trades 
appear to have a negative no impact on return.  
In summary, Table 3-2 and 3-3 show that the president net purchases can 
significantly impact post-announcement returns, and the CEO trades are mostly ignored by 
the market. These findings support the idea that investors value the signals from the insiders 
with the most hands-on experience in running the company. Investors will believe in the 
merger if the president is confident enough to invest his personal assets in the firm.  
To answer the question of CEO-president duality, I use a subsample of 
announcements from firms with CEO-president executives. Table 3-4 present the impact 
of trades by these top insiders holding two titles. It appears that their trades do not impact 
the post-announcement return. This finding implies that the market does not believe a 
CEO-president can successfully merge two companies. Even when these dual insiders buy 
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more shares of the firm before the announcement, the market does not take the signals as 
credible.  
Table 3-5 reports the impact of the trades of CEOs (presidents) who are not 
presidents (CEOs)—no duality effects. In this subsample, the executive roles are clearly 
separated. In this case, I find that the president net purchases can increase the three-month 
and six-month post-announcement returns. A one percent increase in the president net 
purchases during months [-3, 0] can increase the three- and six-month return by 5.57%** 
and 6.71%*, respectively. A one percent increase in the president net purchases during 
months [-6, -3] can increase the three- and six-month return by 8.12%*** and 13.00%***, 
respectively. Conversely, the CEO net purchases during the three months prior to the 
announcement can reduce the three- and six-month return by 3.59%* and 5.10%*. 
To check the robustness of my conclusion that the president net purchases have a 
significant and positive impact on post-announcement return, I divide the full sample of 
announcements based on post-merger performance to make sure that there are no 
endogeneity issues between successful mergers and president net purchases. A merger is 
considered successful if it results in a positive one-year cumulative abnormal return using 
the Fama-French plus momentum risk model. Similarly, if the merger results in a negative 
one-year cumulative abnormal return, then it is categorized as an unsuccessful merger. 
Table 3-6 shows the effects of the president net purchase on a successful merger. It 
appears that the president net trades during months [-6, -3] have a significant and positive 
impact on the post-announcement return. A one percent increase in net purchases can 
increase post-announcement return by 15.97%**, which is economically significant as 
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well. Contrastingly, the CEO net purchases do not impact return. In Table 3-7, I provide 
evidence that even around a bad merger the president net purchases have a positive and 
significant impact on return. In an unsuccessful merger, a one percent increase in the 
president net purchases can increase post-announcement return by 20.99%*** during 
months [-12, -9] and by 9.05%* during the three months prior to the announcement. It 
appears that the market perceives the president net purchases as positive signals regardless 
if the merger actually results in a good or bad transaction. 
VI. Conclusion 
Around cross-border mergers, it appears that the top executive with the most 
influence on the post-announcement return is the president of the company, not the CEO. 
This finding supports the semi-strong form of the insider information hierarchy hypothesis. 
My research also explains that CEO-president duality may not be beneficial to the firm 
going through a merger. Investors prefer executives with clearly delineated sets of 
responsibilities, and they are more confident in the merger if the president is willing to 
invest his personal assets in the firm’s stocks.  
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Figure 3-1 
Top Ten Cross-Border Target Counties 
The graph shows the percentages of cross-border and domestic M&A in my sample from 1986 to 2014.  Our 
M&A data come from the Securities Data Company.  
Target Nations Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Cumulative Percent 
United Kingdom 1,961 17 1,961 17 
Canada 1,422 12 3,383 29 
Germany 882 8 4,265 37 
France 661 6 4,926 43 
Australia 536 5 5,462 47 
India 405 4 5,867 51 
Italy 397 3 6,264 54 
Brazil 391 3 6,655 58 
China 355 3 7,010 61 
Mexico 335 3 7,345 64 
Other Countries 4,190 36 11,535 100 
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Figure 3-2 
Cross-border and Domestic M&A from 1986-2014 
The graph shows the percentages of cross-border and domestic M&A in my sample from 1986 to 2014.  Our M&A data come from the Securities Data 
Company.  
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Table 3-1 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
The table shows the cumulative average abnormal return for domestic and cross-border M&A. I examine 
both monthly and daily CAARs. In the monthly CAARs, the estimation period ends seven months before the 
announcement date with a minimum estimation length of three months and a maximum of 12 months. In the 
daily CAARS, the estimation period ends 181 days before the announcement date with a minimum estimation 
length of three days and a maximum of 360 days. For the testing periods, I use several windows based on the 
short seller and insider trading patterns on a monthly basis. I also include testing periods from existing 
research on M&A and insider trading. The testing period of the 6-month pre-announcement period is similar 
to that of Agrawal and Nasser (2012). The event window of (-60, 25) comes from Jabbour, Jalilvand, and 
Switzer (2000). Keown and Pinkerton (1981) use the testing windows of (-18, 10) and (-10, 0) to measure 
the effects of information leakage around the announcement. Hackbarth and Mrellec (2008) and Aybar and 
Ficici (2009) both use a 3-day testing period to study the impacts of the announcement. ***, **, * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Monthly CAARs for domestic and cross-border M&A 
Testing Windows Domestic M&A Cross-border M&A All M&A 
[-6, -3] -2.09%*** -0.78% -1.80%*** 
[-3, 0] -1.96%*** 0.40% -1.45%*** 
[0, +3] -3.37%*** -1.85%** -3.04%*** 
[+3, +6] -1.45%** 1.55%* -0.79%* 
[+6, +9] 2.09%*** 0.24% 1.68%*** 
[+9, +12] 0.64% -0.73% 0.34% 
 
Panel B: Daily CAARs for domestic and cross-border M&A 
Testing Windows Domestic M&A Cross-border M&A All M&A 
[-180,0] -3.62%*** 1.30% -2.57%*** 
[-60,+25] -1.63%** 1.05% -1.06%* 
[-18,+10] -0.77%* 0.49% -0.50% 
[-12,0] 0.10% -0.02% 0.08% 
[-1,+1] 0.83%*** -0.08% 0.63%*** 
[-40,+5] -0.39% 0.77% -0.15% 
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Table 3-2 
President and CEO Trading Impact on Three-Month, Post-Announcement Return for Cross-Border 
Mergers 
This table reports the impact of the president and CEO trading on the three-month post-announcement stock 
return. President [-3, 0] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the three months before 
the announcement. President [-6, -3] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the month -
6 to -3 relative to the announcement. President [-9, -6] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm 
during the month -9 to -6 relative to the announcement. President [-12, -9] is the net shares traded by the 
president of the firm during the month -12 to -9 relative to the announcement. CEO [-3, 0], CEO [-6, -3], 
CEO [-9, -6], and CEO [-12, -9] are the CEO net trading during the months around the announcement. All 
Insiders [-3, 0], All Insiders [-6, -3], All Insiders [-9, -6], and All Insiders [-12, -9] are the net insider trading 
by all insiders during the months around the announcements. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
N=6,261 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
President [-3,0] 0.0344**    
President [-6,-3]  0.0496***   
President [-9,-6]   -0.0065  
President [-12,-9]    0.0179 
MKTRF 0.8184*** 0.8555*** 0.8497*** 0.8619*** 
SMB 0.4430*** 0.4399*** 0.3709*** 0.4175*** 
HML 0.1904* 0.2927*** 0.2595** 0.2829*** 
UMD 0.0700 0.0849 0.0882 0.1140* 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1906 0.2933* 0.3009* 0.3271* 
     
Adjusted R-Square 0.1349 0.1447 0.1311 0.1346 
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N=6,202 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
CEO [-3,0] -0.0094    
CEO [-6,-3]  0.0371**   
CEO [-9,-6]   -0.0199  
CEO [-12,-9]    0.0014 
MKTRF 0.8204*** 0.8534*** 0.8490*** 0.8633*** 
SMB 0.4402*** 0.4368*** 0.3727*** 0.4152*** 
HML 0.1898* 0.2890*** 0.2582** 0.2820*** 
UMD 0.0675 0.0828 0.0877 0.1149* 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1908 0.2939* 0.3014* 0.3278* 
     
Adjusted R-Square 0.1342 0.1442 0.1313 0.1344 
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N=4,988 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
President [-3,0] 0.0447**        0.0518** 
President [-6,-3]  0.0840***       0.0850*** 
President [-9,-6]   -0.0155      -0.0359 
President [-12,-9]    0.0338*     0.0358* 
CEO [-3,0]     -0.0117    -0.0350* 
CEO [-6,-3]      0.0287*   -0.0031 
CEO [-9,-6]       -0.0144  0.0011 
CEO [-12,-9]        0.0033 -0.0136 
All Insiders [-3,0] 0.0049 0.0096* 0.0090* 0.0092* 0.0105* 0.0089* 0.0091* 0.0091* 0.0091* 
All Insiders  [-6,-3] 0.0067 -0.0014 0.0067 0.0067 0.0066 0.0037 0.0067 0.0067 -0.0013 
All Insiders  [-9,-6] -0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0016 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0013 -0.0029 0.0001 
All Insiders  [-12,-9] -0.0075 -0.0069 -0.0074 -0.0105 -0.0072 -0.0077 -0.0074 -0.0078 -0.0084 
MKTRF 0.8620*** 0.8718*** 0.8649*** 0.8624*** 0.8646*** 0.8642*** 0.8633*** 0.8642*** 0.8703*** 
SMB 0.4665*** 0.4618*** 0.4592*** 0.4635*** 0.4635*** 0.4603*** 0.4628*** 0.4631*** 0.4590*** 
HML 0.2712** 0.2809** 0.2726** 0.2733** 0.2760** 0.2726** 0.2734** 0.2736** 0.2823** 
UMD 0.0709 0.0768 0.0743 0.0711 0.0721 0.0716 0.0728 0.0720 0.0804 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.2322 0.2165 0.2322 0.2375* 0.2326 0.2280 0.2316 0.2337 0.2145 
          
Adjusted R-Square 0.1448 0.1474 0.1440 0.1444 0.1439 0.1443 0.1440 0.1438 0.1484 
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Table 3-3 
President and CEO Trading Impact on Six-Month,  
Post-Announcement Stock Return for Cross-Border Mergers 
This table reports the impact of the president and CEO trading on the six-month post-announcement stock return. President [-3, 0] is the net shares traded by 
the president of the firm during the three months before the announcement. President [-6, -3] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the 
month -6 to -3 relative to the announcement. President [-9, -6] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the month -9 to -6 relative to the 
announcement. President [-12, -9] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the month -12 to -9 relative to the announcement. CEO [-3, 0], 
CEO [-6, -3], CEO [-9, -6], and CEO [-12, -9] are the CEO net trading during the months around the announcement. All Insiders [-3, 0], All Insiders [-6, -3], 
All Insiders [-9, -6], and All Insiders [-12, -9] are the net insider trading by all insiders during the months around the announcements. ***, **, * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
N=4,988 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
President [-3,0] 0.0442        0.0613** 
President [-6,-3]  0.0986***       0.1113*** 
President [-9,-6]   -0.0486      -0.0700** 
President [-12,-9]    0.0091     0.0235 
CEO [-3,0]     -0.0280    -0.0516* 
CEO [-6,-3]      0.0258   -0.0098 
CEO [-9,-6]       -0.0330  0.0024 
CEO [-12,-9]        -0.0241 -0.0323 
All Insiders [-3,0] 0.0005 0.0052 0.0044 0.0046 0.0080 0.0044 0.0047 0.0045 0.0058 
All Insiders  [-6,-3] 0.0133* 0.0039 0.0133* 0.0134* 0.0132 0.0106 0.0134 0.0135* 0.0036 
All Insiders  [-9,-6] -0.0055 -0.0063 -0.0016 -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0058 -0.0022 -0.0056 0.0001 
All Insiders  [-12,-9] 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0000 0.0002 0.0030 0.0028 
MKTRF 0.4562*** 0.4673*** 0.4603*** 0.4579*** 0.4592*** 0.4583*** 0.4562*** 0.4590*** 0.4694*** 
SMB -0.0835 -0.0885 -0.0989 -0.0869 -0.0859 -0.0894 -0.0874 -0.0873 -0.0980 
HML -0.7694*** -0.7585*** -0.7704*** -0.7669*** -0.7616*** -0.7679*** -0.7676*** -0.7651*** -0.7542*** 
UMD -0.3498*** -0.3431*** -0.3415*** -0.3490*** -0.3486*** -0.3491*** -0.3469*** -0.3485*** -0.3334*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.4722 0.4536 0.4703 0.4743 0.4718 0.4684 0.4697 0.4684 0.4425 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1668 0.1687 0.1669 0.1663 0.1666 0.1665 0.1666 0.1665 0.1698 
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Table 3-4 
CEO-President Duality Trading Impact on Post-Announcement Stock Return 
This table reports the impact of trades by CEOs that are also presidents of the company on the three- and six-
month, post-announcement stock return. CEO/president [-3, 0], CEO/president [-6, -3], CEO/president [-9, 
-6], and CEO/president [-12, -9] are the CEO/president net trading during the months around the 
announcement. All Insiders [-3, 0], All Insiders [-6, -3], All Insiders [-9, -6], and All Insiders [-12, -9] are 
the net insider trading by all insiders during the months around the announcements. N is the number of 
announcements. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 N= 841 N= 841 
 Three-Month Return Six-Month Return 
CEO/president [-3,0] 0.0277 -0.0067 
CEO/president [-6,-3] 0.0521 -0.0092 
CEO/president [-9,-6] -0.0083 -0.0122 
CEO/president [-12,-9] 0.0266 -0.0397 
All Insiders [-3,0] 0.0125 0.0297 
All Insiders  [-6,-3] 0.0112 0.0363* 
All Insiders  [-9,-6] -0.0180 -0.0026 
All Insiders  [-12,-9] -0.0095 -0.0157 
MKTRF 0.7539*** 0.4571 
SMB 0.4599* -0.1064 
HML 0.9440*** 0.0714 
UMD 0.4931*** -0.0799 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1472 0.2839 
   
Adjusted R-Square 0.1279 0.1579 
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Table 3-5 
CEO-President Non-Duality Trading Impact on Post-Announcement Stock Return 
This table reports the impact of trades of CEOs (presidents) that are not presidents (CEOs) of the firm on the 
three- and six-month, post-announcement stock return. President [-3, 0] is the net shares traded by the 
president of the firm during the three months before the announcement. President [-6, -3] is the net shares 
traded by the president of the firm during the month -6 to -3 relative to the announcement. President [-9, -6] 
is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the month -9 to -6 relative to the announcement. 
President [-12, -9] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the month -12 to -9 relative to 
the announcement. CEO [-3, 0], CEO [-6, -3], CEO [-9, -6], and CEO [-12, -9] are the CEO net trading 
during the months around the announcement. All Insiders [-3, 0], All Insiders [-6, -3], All Insiders [-9, -6], 
and All Insiders [-12, -9] are the net insider trading by all insiders during the months around the 
announcements. N is the number of announcements. ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 N=4,136 N=4,136 
 Three-Month Return Six-Month Return 
President [-3,0] 0.0557** 0.0671* 
President [-6,-3] 0.0812*** 0.1300*** 
President [-9,-6] -0.0315 -0.0780** 
President [-12,-9] 0.0341 0.0317 
CEO [-3,0] -0.0359* -0.0510* 
CEO [-6,-3] 0.0111 0.0185 
CEO [-9,-6] -0.0047 -0.0081 
CEO [-12,-9] -0.0099 -0.0221 
All Insiders [-3,0] 0.0070 0.0014 
All Insiders  [-6,-3] -0.0037 -0.0033 
All Insiders  [-9,-6] 0.0034 0.0019 
All Insiders  [-12,-9] -0.0081 0.0055 
MKTRF 0.8740*** 0.4557*** 
SMB 0.4508*** -0.1059 
HML 0.1309 -0.9069*** 
UMD -0.0460 -0.3937*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1607 0.2372 
   
Adjusted R-Square 0.1635 0.1842 
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Table 3-6 
President and CEO Impact on Successful Mergers 
This table reports the impact of the CEO and president net purchases on the three-month, post-announcement 
stock return. President [-3, 0] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the three months 
before the announcement. President [-6, -3] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the 
month -6 to -3 relative to the announcement. President [-9, -6] is the net shares traded by the president of the 
firm during the month -9 to -6 relative to the announcement. President [-12, -9] is the net shares traded by 
the president of the firm during the month -12 to -9 relative to the announcement. CEO [-3, 0], CEO [-6, -
3], CEO [-9, -6], and CEO [-12, -9] are the CEO net trading during the months around the announcement. 
All Insiders [-3, 0], All Insiders [-6, -3], All Insiders [-9, -6], and All Insiders [-12, -9] are the net insider 
trading by all insiders during the months around the announcements. N is the number of announcements. 
***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
N=345 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
President [-3,0] -0.0019    
President [-6,-3]  0.1495*   
President [-9,-6]   0.0195  
President [-12,-9]    -0.0200 
All Insiders [-12,0] Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.0907 0.0909 0.0908 0.0896 
Adjusted R-Square 0.2154 0.2251 0.2157 0.2156 
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N=345 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
President [-3,0]     0.0227 
President [-6,-3]     0.1597** 
President [-9,-6]     0.0291 
President [-12,-9]     -0.0296 
CEO [-3,0] -0.0919    -0.1105 
CEO [-6,-3]  -0.0661   -0.0743 
CEO [-9,-6]   -0.0307  -0.0351 
CEO [-12,-9]    -0.0171 0.0037 
All Insiders [-12,0] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.0801 0.0874 0.0885 0.0901 0.0718 
Adjusted R-Square 0.2214 0.2172 0.2161 0.2156 0.2182 
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Table 3-7 
President and CEO Impact on Unsuccessful Mergers 
This table reports the impact of the CEO and president net purchases on the three-month, post-announcement 
stock return. President [-3, 0] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the three months 
before the announcement. President [-6, -3] is the net shares traded by the president of the firm during the 
month -6 to -3 relative to the announcement. President [-9, -6] is the net shares traded by the president of the 
firm during the month -9 to -6 relative to the announcement. President [-12, -9] is the net shares traded by 
the president of the firm during the month -12 to -9 relative to the announcement. CEO [-3, 0], CEO [-6, -
3], CEO [-9, -6], and CEO [-12, -9] are the CEO net trading during the months around the announcement. 
All Insiders [-3, 0], All Insiders [-6, -3], All Insiders [-9, -6], and All Insiders [-12, -9] are the net insider 
trading by all insiders during the months around the announcements. N is the number of announcements. 
***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
N=382 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
President [-3,0] 0.0913*    
President [-6,-3]  0.0430   
President [-9,-6]   -0.0248  
President [-12,-9]    0.1670*** 
All Insiders [-12,0] Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.0652* 0.0674* 0.0643* 0.0784** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.3041 0.0200 0.2979 0.3149 
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N=382 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
President [-3,0]     0.0905* 
President [-6,-3]     0.0671 
President [-9,-6]     -0.0572 
President [-12,-9]     0.2099*** 
CEO [-3,0] 0.0650    0.0431 
CEO [-6,-3]  -0.0072   0.0018 
CEO [-9,-6]   -0.0776*  -0.0478 
CEO [-12,-9]    -0.0170 -0.0904 
All Insiders [-12,0] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.0745* 0.0656* 0.0648* 0.0665* 0.0808** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.3003 0.2973 0.3032 0.2974 0.3226 
96 
REFERENCES 
Acharya, V.V., Johnson, T.C., 2010. More insides, more insider trading: evidence from 
private-equity buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics 98, 500-523. 
 
Admati, A., Pfleiderer, P., 1988. A theory of intraday patterns: volume and price 
variability. Review of Financial Studies 1, 3-40. 
 
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J.F., 1995. Does Section 16b deter insider trading by target managers? 
Journal of Financial Economics 39, 295-319. 
 
Agrawal, A., Nasser, T., 2012. Insider trading in takeover targets. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 18, 598-625. 
 
Allen, F., Michaely, R., 2003. Payout policy. Handbook of the Economics of Finance 1, 
337-429. 
 
Alexander, G., Peterson, M., 2007. An analysis of trade size clustering and its relation to 
stealth trading. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 435-471. 
 
Alexander, G., Peterson, M., Beardsley, X., 2014. The puzzling behavior of short sellers 
around earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Intermediation 23, 255-278. 
 
Aybar, B., Ficici, A., 2009. Cross-border acquisitions and firm value: an analysis of 
emerging-market multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies 40, 1317-1338. 
 
Baker, M., Litov, L., Wachter, J., Wurgler, J., 2010. Can mutual fund managers pick 
stocks? Evidence from their trades prior to earnings announcements. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 45, 1111-1131.  
 
Bargeron, L., Kulchania, M., Thomas, S., 2011. Accelerated share repurchases. Journal of 
Financial Economics 101, 69-89. 
 
Bens, D., Nagar, V., Skinner, D., Wong, M.H., 2003. Employee stock options, EPS 
dilution, and stock repurchases. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 51-90. 
 
Bernhardt, D., Hollifield, B., Hughson, E., 1995. Investment and insider trading. Review 
of Financial Studies 8, 501-543. 
 
Bhattacharya, S., 1979. Imperfect information, dividend policy, and "the bird in the hand" 
fallacy. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259–270. 
 
97 
Bliss, R., Rosen, R., 2001. CEO compensation and bank mergers. Journal of Financial 
Economics 61, 107-138. 
 
Bogle, J., 2008. Black Monday and black swans. Financial Analysts Journal 64, 30-40. 
 
Bonaime, A., 2012. Repurchases, reputation, and returns. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 47, 469-491. 
 
Bonaime, A., Ryngaert, M., 2013. Insider trading and share repurchases: Do insiders and 
firms trade in the same direction? Journal of Corporate Finance 22, 35-53. 
 
Bris, A., Cabolis, C., 2008. The value of investor protection: Firm evidence from cross-
border mergers. Review of Financial Studies 21, 605-648. 
 
Bushee, B., 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? 
Contemporary Accounting Research 18, 207-246. 
 
Chakravarty, S., 2001. Stealth trading: Which traders’ trades move stock prices? Journal 
of Financial Economics 61, 289-307. 
 
Chakravarty, S., Jain, P., Upson, J., Wood, R., 2012. Clean sweep: informed trading 
through intermarket sweep orders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, 415-
435. 
 
Chan, K., Ikenberry, D., Lee, I., Wang, Y., 2012. Informed traders: linking legal insider 
trading and share repurchases. Financial Analysts Journal 68, 60–73. 
 
Chang, S., Suk, D., 1998. Stock prices and secondary dissemination of information: The 
Wall Street Journal's "Insider Spotlight" column. Financial Review 33, 115-128. 
 
Chen, H., Jegadeesh, N., Wermers, R., 2000. The value of active mutual fund management: 
An examination of the stockholdings and trades of mutual fund managers. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 343–368. 
 
Cicero, D., Wintoki, M. B., 2014. Insider Trading Patterns. Working paper. University of 
Alabama and University of Kansas. 
 
Christophe, S., Ferri, M., Angel, J., 2004. Short-selling prior to earnings announcements. 
Journal of Finance 59, 1845-1875. 
 
Daniel, K., Grinblatt, M., Titman, S., Wermers, R., 1997. Measuring mutual fund 
performance with characteristic-based benchmarks. Journal of Finance 52, 1035–1058. 
 
98 
De Cesari, A., Espenlaub, S., Khurshed, A., Simkovic, M., 2012. The effect of ownership 
and stock liquidity on the timing of repurchase transactions. Journal of Corporate Finance 
18, 1023-1050. 
 
De Lisle, R.J., Morscheck, J.D., Nofsinger, J.R., 2014. Share repurchases and institutional 
supply. Journal of Corporate Finance 27, 216-230. 
 
El-Khatib, R., Fogel, K., Jandik, T., 2015. CEO network centrality and merger 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics 116, 349-382. 
 
Fidrmuc, J.P., Goergen, M., Renneboog, L., 2006. Insider trading, news releases, and 
ownership concentration. Journal of Finance 61, 2931-2973. 
 
Fried, J., 2005. Informed trading and false signaling with open market repurchases. 
California Law Review 93, 1323-1386. 
 
Fu, R., Kraft, A., Zhang, H., 2012. Financial reporting frequency, information asymmetry, 
and the cost of equity. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54, 132-149. 
 
Garvey, R., Wu, F., 2014. Clustering of intraday order-sizes by uninformed versus 
informed traders. Journal of Banking and Finance 41, 222-235. 
 
Grinblatt, M., and Titman, S., 1993. Performance measurement without benchmarks: An 
examination of mutual fund returns. Journal of Business 66, 47–68. 
 
Grullon, G., Michaely, R., 2004. The Information content of share repurchase programs. 
Journal of Finance 59, 651–680. 
 
Gubbi, S.R., Aulakh, P.S., Ray, S., Sarkar, MB., Chittoor, R., 2010. Do international 
acquisitions by emerging-economy firms create shareholder value? The case of Indian 
firms. Journal of International Business Studies 41, 397-418.  
 
Hackbarth, D., Morellec, E., 2008. Stock returns in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of 
Finance 63, 1213-1252.  
 
Harris, D., Helfat, C., 1998. CEO duality, succession, capabilities and agency theory: 
Commentary and research agenda. Strategic Management Journal 19, 901-904. 
 
Hartzell, J., Ofek, E., Yermack, D., 2004. What's in it for me? CEOs whose firms are 
acquired. Review of Financial Studies 17, 37-61. 
 
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., Vermaelen, T., 1995. Market underreaction to open market 
share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181-208. 
 
99 
Irvine, P., Lipson, M., Puckett, A., 2007. Tipping. Review of Financial Studies 20, 741-
768. 
 
Jabbour, A.R., Jalilvand, A., Switzer, J.A., 2000. Pre-bid price run-ups and insider trading 
activity. International Review of Financial Analysis 9, 21-43. 
 
Jain, P., Wang, Q., 2013. Credit-rating changes and institutional trading. Journal of Trading 
8, 38-47. 
 
Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review 76, 323–329. 
 
Ke, B., Petroni, K., 2004. How Informed Are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? 
Evidence from Their Trading Behavior before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings 
Increases. Journal of Accounting Research 42, 895-927. 
 
Keown, A.J., Pinkerton, J.M., 1981. Merger announcements and insider trading activity: 
an empirical investigation. Journal of Finance 36, 855-869.  
 
Keung, E., Lin, Z-K., Shih, M., 2010. Does the stock market see a zero or small positive 
earnings surprise as a red flag? Journal of Accounting Research 48, 105-136. 
 
Kim, O., Verrecchia, R., 1991. Trading volume and price reactions to public 
announcements. Journal of Accounting Research 29, 302-321. 
 
King, D.R., Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Covin, J.G., 2004. Meta-analyses of post-
acquisition performance: indications of unidentified moderators. Strategic Management 
Journal 25, 187-200. 
 
Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315-1336. 
Lehn, K., Zhao, M., 2006. CEO turnover after acquisitions: Are bad bidders fired? Journal 
of Finance 61, 1759-1811.  
 
Lin, J.C., Howe, J., 1990. Insider trading at the OTC Market, Journal of Finance 52, 1273-
1284. 
 
Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2008. Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the 
market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89, 20-43. 
 
Manne, H., 1966. Insider trading and the stock market. The Free Press 7, 93-158. 
 
Miller, M.H., Rock, K., 1985. Dividend policy under asymmetric information. Journal of 
Finance 40, 1031–1051. 
 
100 
Moeller, S., Schlingemann, F.P., Stulz, R.M., 2005. Wealth destruction on a massive scale? 
A study of acquiring-firm returns in the recent merger wave. Journal of Finance 60, 757-
782. 
 
Moulton, P., 2005. You can’t always get what you want: Trade-size clustering and quantity 
choice in liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics 78, 89-119. 
 
Ofer, A.R., Thakor, A.V., 1987. A theory of stock price responses to alternative corporate 
cash disbursement methods: stock repurchases and dividends. Journal of Finance 42, 365–
394. 
 
Nunn, K., Madden, G., Gombola, M., 1983. Are some insiders more “inside” than others? 
Journal of Portfolio Management 9, 18-22. 
 
Peyer, U., Vermaelen, T., 2009. The nature and persistence of buyback anomalies. Review 
of Financial Studies 22, 1693-1745. 
 
Rovenpor, J., 1993. The relationship between four personal characteristics of chief 
executive officers (CEOs) and company merger and acquisition activity (MAA). Journal 
of Business and Psychology 8, 27-55. 
 
Serfling, M., 2014. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 25, 251-273. 
 
Seyhun, H.N., 1986. Insiders' profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency. Journal of 
Financial Economics 16, 189–212. 
 
Seyhun, N.H., 2000. Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading. MIT Press. 
 
Skinner, D., 2008. The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and stock 
repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 582-609. 
 
Spritzer, G., 2010. Alarming decrease in NYSE average trade size. Seeking Alpha. 
 
Vermaelen, T., 1981. Common stock repurchases and market signaling. Journal of 
Financial Economics 9, 139-183. 
 
Verrecchia, R., 2001. Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32, 97–
180.  
 
Wermers, R., 2000. Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock-
picking talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses. Journal of Finance 55, 1655–1695. 
 
Worrell, D. L., Nemec, C., Davidson, W. N., 1997. One hat too many: Key executive 
plurality and shareholder wealth. Strategic Management Journal 18, 499-507.
101 
VITA 
VINH HUY NGUYEN 
 
Born, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 
 
2005-2009   B.B.A., Business Honors Program, 
    Supply Chain Management 
    The University of Texas at Austin 
    Austin, Texas 
 
2011-2012   M.S., Finance 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, Florida 
 
2012-2016   Doctoral Candidate 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, Florida 
 
2013-2016   Instructor 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, Florida 
 
PRESENTATIONS 
 
Institutional foresight: Do institutions profit around repurchase announcements? Presented 
at the 2016 Global Finance Conference in Fresno, California. 
 
Institutional foresight: Do institutions profit around repurchase announcements? Presented 
at the 2016 Eastern Finance Conference in Baltimore, Maryland.  
 
 
